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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Background to the audit
1. This report concerns the implementation of the
protocols which are the most traditional instruments of
cooperation with non-Member Mediterranean Countries
(NMCs). More particularly, it concerns the management
of the Third and Fourth Protocols and is a continuation
of the Court’s Special Report No 3/91 on the
management of the first two series of Protocols (1). This
Report is the last part of the Court’s overall audit of the
New Mediterranean Policy (NMP) and therefore
complements the ones on the structural adjustment
support measures (2) and decentralised cooperation via
the MED programmes (3).
2. This report comes at a time when the NMP has been
given a new dimension after the Council’s adoption of
Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 relating to
financial and technical measures to support the reform of
(1) See Special Report No 3/91 (OJ C 252, 26.9.1991).
(2) See the Court’s Annual Report on the financial year 1994
(OJ C 303, 14.11.1995).
(3) See Special Report No 1/96 (OJ C 240, 19.8.1996).
economic and social structures within the framework of
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA). The latter,
which is ultimately intended to provide a framework for
all aid to the NMCs, has set an indicative amount of
3 424,5 Mio ECU for the period from 1995 to 1999.
During this reference period the implementation of the
Protocols will be pursued in parallel until the
appropriations earmarked for this purpose have been
used up.
3. The Court’s work was concerned exclusively with
measures funded from budgetary appropriations for the
benefit of the seven Maghreb and Mashreq countries (4).
This includes operations that benefited from risk capital
managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) on the
Commission’s behalf and those that gave rise to
budgetary financing in the form of interest-rate subsidies
on loans granted by the Bank from its own resources.
4. In addition to its conclusions on the application of
the Protocols themselves, the report sets out to highlight
the structural problems which could still affect the
management of cooperation with the NMCs, including
cooperation falling under the new MEDA arrangements.
(4)  Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and
Tunisia.C 98/3 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Approach adopted and scope of the audit
5. The Court’s audit includes an analysis of the system
of Protocols and the Commission’s management of them.
In respect of the latter, it looks more specifically at the
systems set up from the planning of the aid up to the
ex-post evaluation of the projects, including the
procedures for selecting technical assistance and the
examination of the services technical assistance provides.
6. The audit involved visits to four countries: Egypt,
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. In this connection,
detailed audits were carried out on a sample of 16
projects, which are shown in summary form in Table
No 1.
TABLE 1
SAMPLE — SUMMARY PROJECTS
Recipient country EGYPT
Name of project: Helwan Waste Water
Project — Phase II
Nile Valley Regional
Project
Food Sector
Development
Programme
Ras Mohamed National
Park
Total cost 35 Mio ECU 3 Mio ECU Mio ECU — not
indicated
4,2 Mio ECU
EEC Contribution 32 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocols)
2,5 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocols)
55 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocols)
2,5 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocols)
Ref. No SEM/03/220/005A SEM/03/220/008A SEM/03/220/020A SEM/03/220/025A
FA signed on 9.7.1988 (3/EG) 16.10.1989 16.7.1990 (7/EG) 28.4.1992 (11/EG)
Duration of project Completion date
6.7.1993 — extended to
16.4.1995
4 years 4 years extended to end 1996
Recipient country JORDAN
Name of project National Soil Map and
Land Use Project
Economic Geology
Project
Ground Water
Investigation in
Hammad and Sirhan
basins
Cooperation Project in
Science and Technology
Total cost not indicated 1,2 Mio ECU 4 Mio ECU 4 Mio ECU
EEC Contribution 3 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
1 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
4 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
3,5 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
Ref. No SEM/03/628/005 SEM/03/628/013 SEM/03/628/028 SEM/03/628/033A
FA signed on 18.4.1989 (142/OJ) 23.4.1990 (147/OJ) 21.10.1991 (170/OJ) 29.9.1992 (183/OJ)
Duration of project 5 years (R April 1995) 2 years 3,5 years 3 years — extended
May 1997C 98/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Recipient country MOROCCO
Name of project Agricultural
Development Fund
(ADF)
Contribution to the
improvement of the
system of teaching
science and technology
in Morocco
Contribution to the
development of training
structures in the textile
and leather industries
Rehabilitation and
protection of parts of
the Ouarzazate and
Moulouya disaster areas
Total cost 60 Mio ECU 64 Mio ECU 34,98 Mio ECU 5 Mio ECU
EEC Contribution 30 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
40 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
28,075 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
5 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
Ref. No SEM/03/204/002 SEM/03/204/006 SEM/03/204/012 SEM/03/204/013
FA signed on 13.2.1990 (150/MAR) 26.10.1990 (159/MAR) 15.7.1991 (166/MAR) 30.7.1991 (169/MAR)
Duration of project Completion date:
31.12.1994
Initially planned for
1990-1994 — extended
until 30.6.1996
48 months (30.6.1995) Completion date:
31.12.1993
Recipient country TUNISIA
Name of project Agricultural
Development to the
south-west of Kef
Creation of the Rijm
Maatoug palm grove
Loan operations for the
benefit of small and
medium-sized
agricultural enterprises
in Tunisia
Exploitation of water
resources in the
Governorate of
Kasserine
Total cost 26 Mio ECU 32 Mio ECU 12 Mio ECU 7 Mio ECU
EEC Contribution 10 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
15 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
12 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
7 Mio ECU
(3rd Protocol)
Ref. No SEM/03/212/004 SEM/03/212/010 SEM/03/212/015 SEM/03/212/017A
FA signed on 9.7.1988 (123/TU) 11.8.1989 (153/TU) 29.4.1991 (167/TU) 30.9.1991 (171/TU)
Duration of project 5 years 5 years (commencing in
November 89)
Initially planned for
1991-1992. The project
was completed in
1993-1994 (2 years
late).
5 years from
1992-1996, completion
date: 9/1996
Source: Court of Auditors.
7. This Report consists of three parts. The first
introduces the system of Protocols and includes the
observations arising from the Court’s examination of the
model of cooperation created through the system of
Protocols. The second is devoted to the operations that
were managed directly by the Commission. The third,
finally, deals with those operations which were managed
under mandate by the EIB.
THE PROTOCOL SYSTEM
General Presentation
8. The Protocols, which are bilateral agreements under
Article 238 of the EC Treaty, were initiated in 1979.
They form an overall legal framework for financial and
technical cooperation between the European Community
and each NMC for a given period (normally five years).
Thus, this approach to cooperation is characterised by
two levels of organisation, because the funding of any
given project requires the signing of a specific financing
agreement.
9. The Protocols adopt an overall budget, specify the
source of the appropriations, depending on whether they
come from the general budget of the Community or EIB
own resources, and the nature of the financing —
non-refundable aid, risk capital or loans.
10. The total aid budget made available to the seven
countries in question amounted to 3 548 Mio ECU. Of
this amount, 2 158 Mio ECU (60,8 %) was financed
from EIB own resources and 1 390 Mio ECU (39,2 %)C 98/5 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
from the general budget (1 273 Mio ECU in grants and
117 Mio ECU in the form of risk capital). Tables No 2a
and 2b give a breakdown of this distribution for each of
the countries concerned. Together with those for the first
two series of Protocols, these sums amount to 5 232 Mio
ECU, 2 112 Mio ECU of which comes from the
Community budget and 3 120 Mio ECU from the EIB’s
own resources.
OVERALL BUDGET FOR THE THIRD AND FOURTH PROTOCOLS
TABLE 2a
Cooperation under the Third Protocols
(Mio Ecu)
ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA EGYPT JORDAN LEBANON SYRIA TOTAL
Signature of the Protocol 26.10.87 26.5.88 26.10.87 26.10.87 26.10.87 2.12.87 7.2.91
Council Decision 21.12.87 30.6.88 21.12.87 21.12.87 21.12.87 21.12.87 16.11.92
Entry into force 1.3.88 1.7.88 22.12.87 22.12.87 1.2.88 1.3.88 17.11.92
— EIB loans 183 151 131 249 63 53 110 940
— non-refundable aid 52 162 87 189 35 19 34 578
— risk capital 4 11 6 11 2 1 2 37
Total 239 324 224 449 100 73 146 1 555
TABLE 2b
Cooperation under the Fourth Protocols
(Mio Ecu)
ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA EGYPT JORDAN LEBANON SYRIA TOTAL
Signature of the Protocol 20.6.91 20.6.91 20.6.91 26.6.91 26.6.91 18.9.91 17.7.91
Council Decision 16.3.92 16.3.92 19.12.91 16.3.92 16.3.92 16.3.92 24.1.94
Entry into force 1.5.92 1.7.93 20.12.91 17.3.92 1.5.92 1.5.92 1.3.94
— EIB loans 280 220 168 310 80 45 115 1 218
— non-refundable aid 52 193 101 242 44 22 41 695
— risk capital 18 25 15 16 2 2 2 80
Total 350 438 284 568 126 69 158 1 993
TOTAL FUNDS ALLOCATED – THIRD & FOURTH PROTOCOLS
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11. Overall, budgetary resources for the Fourth
Protocols were 26 % higher than for the Third.
Appropriations made available for risk capital rose from
37 Mio ECU to 80 Mio ECU, i.e. an increase of 216 %,
which underlines the importance that the
Euro-Mediterranean partners will be attaching in future
to assistance for the private sector.
The special features of the Third and Fourth Protocols
12. The main new feature in the Third and Fourth
Protocols, in comparison with the First and Second,
consisted in a more precise definition of the specific
objectives and the introduction of indicative plans. These
changes were already given positive appraisal in the
Court’s Special Report No 3/91 (5). Article 3 of the Third
and Fourth Protocols defines the general cooperation
objectives while the indicative plans, jointly prepared by
the signatories and the EIB, define specific objectives,
quantify aid to the various priority sectors of activity
within the fields specified in the protocols and, in some
cases, identify the projects to be undertaken.
13. An examination of the projects implemented during
the 3rd and 4th Protocols shows that, generally speaking,
the indicative plans have been adhered to as far as the
areas of intervention are concerned. The Community
interventions under these two last Protocols thus showed
greater cohesion than under the previous series.
14. In contrast to the previous Protocols, neither the
Third nor the Fourth Protocols provide, in respect of the
NMCs covered by the audit, for special loans to be
granted from budgetary resources.
15. Article 4 of the Fourth Protocols mentions 300 Mio
ECU, which was made available in addition to the overall
budget adopted in the Protocol, in order to finance
projects in support of economic reforms undertaken as
part of structural adjustment programmes. Since this
amount is not allotted a priori on a bilateral basis and
the aid is committed according to macro-economic
considerations, the EC is already anticipating, in the
Fourth Protocols, the thinking behind the MEDA
Regulation (6). This concern is also to be found in the
indicative programmes signed with Morocco, Egypt and
Jordan, which reserve 10, 20 and 30 % respectively of
the non-reimbursable aid in the overall budget for these
operations.
Implementation of the Protocols
Progression from one Protocol to the next
16. While, in theory, there was to be a smooth
progression from one series of Protocols to the next, in
practice the four series are running concurrently for all
the seven countries covered by the audit.
17. This situation can be explained, on the one hand, by
an accumulation of delays due to the slowness of the
process of negotiation and ratification of the Protocols,
combined with delays ensuing from the overestimation of
the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries (7), and,
on the other hand, by the possibility contained in the
Protocols for uses to be sought for all residual funds at
the end of the period of application until they are
exhausted. Frequently, these funds are not inconsiderable
amounts.
18. Thus, on 31 December 1991, the commitment
deadline stipulated in the texts of the Third Protocols, the
amounts still to be committed totalled 123,4 Mio ECU,
i.e. 20 % of the overall budget. This percentage, as Table
3 shows, conceals great differences between the Maghreb
and Mashreq countries, which alone account for 96,8 %
of the residue. This situation is attributable to political
reasons in the case of Lebanon and Syria and to technical
and administrative reasons in the case of Egypt.
(5) Paragraph 3.24 of Special Report No 3/91 (OJ C 252,
26.9.1991).
(6) See OJ L 189, 30.7.1996.
(7)  The Court also identified the same problem in the context of
the PHARE Programme (see Special Report No 3/97 on the
decentralised system of implementation for the PHARE
Programme (from 1990-1995) (OJ C 175, 9.6.1997,
paragraph 2.5).C 98/7 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
TABLE 3
TOTAL FUNDS STILL TO BE COMMITTED AT CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD PROTOCOLS
(As at 31.12.1991)
(Mio ECU)
Country Budget
Committed
1988 1989 1990 1991
Total Available
Algeria 56 0,6 26,8 10,9 17,2 55,5 0,5
Morocco 173 11,9 110,4 44,8 2,6 169,7 3,3
Tunisia 93 39,4 20,3 16,9 16,3 92,9 0,1
Egypt 200 33,9 10,4 86,9 10,7 141,9 58,1
Jordan 37 10,5 6,9 8,9 5,3 31,6 5,4
Lebanon 20 02 0
Syria 36 03 6
Total 615 96,3 174,8 168,4 52,1 491,6 123,4
Syria
29%
Algeria
0% Morocco
3% Tunisia
0%
Egypt
48%
Jordan
4%
Lebanon
16%
Source: Commission SINCOM data.C 98/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Utilisation of appropriations as at 31 December 1996
19. Tables 4a and 4b show that 76 projects financed
under the first two series of Protocols had still not been
closed on 31 December 1996. The cumulative total of
appropriations for these projects came, at that date, to
more than 74,6 Mio ECU. It will be noted that, during
the financial year 1996 alone, eight new operations were
committed for a total of 15,76 Mio ECU.
FIRST AND SECOND PROTOCOLS — BREAKDOWN OF REMAINING COMMITMENT BALANCES AS AT 31.12.1996
TABLE 4a
Analysis by Value
(in Mio ECU)
Year of commitment
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Grand
Total
Algeria 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00 11,79 0,00 0,00 3,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 1,92 0,00 10,65 27,46
Egypt 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,43 2,27 0,02 0,07 0,79 0,08 0,01 0,00 2,47 0,00 1,11 0,01 0,08 4,90 5,03 17,27
Jordan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,14 0,45 0,17 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 1,36 0,72 0,00 0,00 0,03 2,98
Lebanon 0,00 0,00 0,13 0,15 0,00 0,00 8,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,26 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 10,64
Morocco 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,65 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,68
Syria 0,34 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,00 5,19 0,00 0,26 0,00 0,00 0,05 1,88 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,83
Tunisia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,02 0,05 0,79
Grand Total 0,34 0,00 0,14 0,58 2,33 7,82 8,31 6,43 12,04 0,32 0,02 5,50 0,74 6,60 0,73 2,08 4,92 15,76 74,66
TABLE 4b
Analysis by Number of Projects
(Number of projects)
Year of commitment
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Grand
Total
Algeria 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 0102 1 3
Egypt 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 2 1313 2 3
Jordan 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 4 2 1 1 0 0 1 1001 1 5
Lebanon 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0000 7
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0010 3
Syria 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0000 6
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0222 9
Grand Total 2 1 2 3 2 5 5 6 9 3 2 4 5 7 2648 7 6
Source: Commission SINCOM data.
20. Table 5 breaks down the utilisation of commitment
and payment appropriations by year and country for the
Third and Fourth Protocols. As at 31 December 1996,
605,4 Mio ECU, i.e. 98 % of the appropriations which
were made available under the Third Protocol, were
committed but only 72 % had been paid. The level of
utilisation of the appropriations made available in the
final series of Protocols is, naturally, lower at 714,5 Mio
ECU, i.e. 92 % for commitment appropriations but only
23 % for payment appropriations. In the case of
payments, those effected correspond, in the main, to the
financing of the structural adjustment support measures.C 98/9 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
TABLE 5
Budgetary implementation as at 31.12.1996
(Mio Ecu)
Third Protocols Fourth Protocols
Appropriations Committed Decommit. Paid Appropriations Committed Decommit. Paid
1988 95,3 15 % 10,8 2%
1989 175,8 29 % 4,9 1%
1990 168,4 27 % 38,9 6%
1991 54,6 9% 77,0 13 % ——
1992 69,5 11 % 78,7 13 % 74,2 10 % 5,0 1%
1993 24,4 4% 71,0 12 % 164,5 21 % 68,9 9%
1994 15,8 2,1 2% 72,2 12 % 219,5 28 % 32,2 4%
1995 9,4 3,1 1% 51,5 8% 209,1 27 % 38,7 5%
1996 16,8 19,4 0% 38,5 6% 50,8 3,6 6% 36,7 5%
Total 615,0 630,0 24,6 98 % 443,5 72 % 775,0 718,1 3,6 92 % 181,5 23 %
Algeria 56,0 60,1 7,5 94 % 20,3 36 % 70,0 52,0 — 74 % 15,9 23 %
Egypt 200,0 213,1 13,2 100 % 133,0 67 % 258,0 251,2 0,6 97 % 25,2 10 %
Jordan 37,0 37,6 0,8 99 % 29,6 80 % 46,0 44,9 0,0 98 % 22,1 48 %
Lebanon 20,0 20,3 0,7 98 % 17,4 87 % 24,0 23,2 — 97 % 6,2 26 %
Morocco 173,0 171,8 — 99 % 154,7 89 % 218,0 206,2 — 95 % 58,6 27 %
Syria 36,0 32,1 — 89 % 8,4 23 % 43,0 22,9 — 53 % 1,0 2%
Tunisia 93,0 95,0 2,4 100 % 80,1 86 % 116,0 117,7 3,0 99 % 52,6 45 %
TOTAL BUDGETARY IMPLEMENTATION THIRD AND FOURTH PROTOCOLS
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Remarks:  For the commitments, the second column represents the decommitments which, according to the Protocol rules, remain available, for further
use.
Source: Commission SINCOM data.C 98/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Budgetary presentation
21. Budgetary appropriations made available under
heading B7-4051 not only include the amounts agreed in
the Third and Fourth Protocols but also the additional
appropriations for the structural adjustment support
programmes to which the Fourth Protocols refer. In the
interest of greater clarity in the budget and its
implementation, it would have been preferable to apply
the principle of specification to these appropriations more
rigorously, and to enter the Protocol budgets and those
additional amounts involved in the structural adjustment
support measures under separate headings.
Legality under Community law
22. In its Special Report No 3/91 the Court points out
that Council Regulation No 3973/86 (8) only refers
explicitly, in its recitals, to the Second Protocols. In its
replies the Commission acknowledged the pertinence of
this observation. The Court notes that Regulation (EEC)
No 1762/92 on the application of the Protocols
concluded between the Community and the NMCs
concerning financial and technical cooperation was not
adopted by the Council until 29 June 1992. As the
Council had not taken a decision to extend the validity of
Regulation No 3973/86, the third series of Protocols was
implemented in the absence of any legal base.
23. This situation had consequences for the
decision-making arrangements concerning interest-rate
subsidies under the Third Protocols. In its Opinion
No 2/86 (9), the Court argued that the procedure
contained in the proposed regulation of 1986 was
unsatisfactory, and that it was necessary ‘to safeguard the
prerogatives of the authority responsible for
implementing the budget’ by giving the Commission the
power to decide in favour of, or against, granting an
interest-rate subsidy on a loan awarded by the EIB. This
observation was not taken into account when Council
Regulation (EC) No 3973/86 was adopted. It was,
however, taken into account in Council Regulation (EC)
No 1762/92. Had steps been taken to ensure that there
was a proper legal base for implementation of the Third
Protocols, the power of the Commission to decide on
interest rate subsidies could have been correctly set out in
a regulation from 1988. As it was, the unsatisfactory
decision rules continued for a further four years.
24. Unlike Regulation No 3973/86, which was adopted
according to the procedure laid down in Article 209 of
the EC Treaty and which requires a prior opinion from
(8) See OJ L 370, 30.12.1986.
(9) See OJ C 302, 27.11.1986.
the Court of Auditors, the 1992 Regulation was not
adopted in accordance with this procedure although it
was identical in nature. Similarly, the adoption of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 (MEDA) did not
follow the procedure set out in Article 209 of the EC
Treaty either. Once any regulation comments on the
provisions for the execution of the budget, its financial
nature might justify a request for the Court’s opinion
prior to its adoption (10).
Conclusions concerning the system of Protocols
25. The Court’s observations concerning the system of
Protocols, contained in Special Report No 3/91, are still,
for the most part, relevant, particularly:
(a)  the slowness of the process of negotiation and
conclusion of the Protocols;
(b)  the absence of a procedure for the closure of the
Protocols which, as a consequence, leads to the
simultaneous implementation of four series of
Protocols;
(c) the negative consequences of the inflexible framework
of the Protocols with a fixed and guaranteed amount
for each recipient country.
26. The objectives set out in the 3rd and 4th Protocols
are more precise than for the first two Protocols, and the
nature of the projects or measures which can be financed
is defined. The indicative plans drawn up within the
framework of the implementation of the Third and
Fourth Protocols have allowed greater consideration to
be given to the priorities set out by the NMCs in their
planning at national level.
27. In spite of the improvements introduced by the 3rd
and 4th Protocols, the inability of the majority of the
NMCs to absorb the sums involved within a reasonable
amount of time has led the European legislature to take a
more flexible approach to the MEDA Regulation. Under
the new system, in contrast to the system of Protocols,
the NMCs no longer dispose of a guaranteed amount of
aid but conclude three-year indicative programmes with
the Community which are based on their individual
capacity to absorb the appropriations and which contain
no precise financial commitment (11).
28. As far as the legal provisions of the protocols are
concerned, the Third Protocols were implemented in the
absence of an adequate legal base and Council
Regulations (EC) No 1762/92 and No 1488/96 were
adopted without preliminary consultation of the Court of
(10)  See the Court’s Annual Report on the financial year 1993,
especially paragraphs 13.19 and following (OJ C 327,
24.11.1994).
(11)  According to Article 105(2) of the Financial Regulation,
protocols are preferential agreements whilst MEDA covers
aid granted autonomously.C 98/11 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Auditors by the legislator, although this requirement is
stipulated in Article 209 of the EC Treaty.
OPERATIONS MANAGED DIRECTLY BY THE
COMMISSION
29. In this section of the report key findings are
presented concerning the instruments and resources
which the Commission uses for the management and
monitoring of projects. The weaknesses identified help to
explain some of the problems and difficulties encountered
in the implementation of the projects, at the level of the
Commission and at that of project management on the
spot.
Management and monitoring instruments
The financing agreements
30. In the context of the operations examined by the
Court, the financing agreement (FA) is the basic
document for the implementation of projects (12). It
formalises the culmination of the preparatory phase and
its importance is determined by the following points:
(a) the agreement constitutes a legal act which sets out
the obligations of the signatories;
(b) as a management instrument, the agreement, amongst
other things, specifies the objectives to be achieved
and the project’s management structures, describes
the implementing procedures and specifies the
procedures for monitoring the operations and
evaluating the results;
(c) on the financial level, the agreement fixes the project’s
overall budget and defines the appropriations
allocated to each of the identified expenditure
headings.
31. In its previous reports, the Court pointed out the
considerable weaknesses of the financing agreements
drawn up by the Commission (13), weaknesses which
(12)  In the case of protocols, most of the projects are set up
under a financing agreement concluded with the national
authorities of the beneficiary country. In some cases,
especially for projects worth less than 1 Mio ECU, a contract
is enough.
(13)  See the Annual Report on the financial year 1991,
paragraphs 15.28 et seq. (OJ C 330, 15.12.1992) for the
projects in Asia and Latin America. Paragraphs 5.20 — 5.32
of Special Report No 3/91 identify similar problems for the
projects in the Mediterranean countries during the First and
Second Protocols (JO C 252, 26.9.1991). Paragraph 5.23 of
Special Report No 3/97 on the decentralised system of
implementation for the PHARE Programme (from
1990-1995) (OJ C 175, 9.6.1997).
were confirmed during this audit. Examination of these
agreements has shown, in fact, that for most of them:
(a)  neither the general nor the specific objectives which
the project sets out to achieve are clearly defined or
quantified. How the expected results are to be
achieved from the means made available is not defined
sufficiently clearly. The consequence is that the final
evaluation of the projects’ success is made more
difficult;
(b)  the description of the structure of the management
bodies with the definition of the various roles and
responsibilities, including those of the technical
assistance units, is too perfunctory (14). This weakness
may subsequently lead to conflicts between the
various bodies responsible (15); in addition, the
agreements are not precise enough in the matter of the
management’s obligation to draw up work schedules,
annual budgets and implementation reports;
(c)  the agreements examined did not contain an
automatic obligation to carry out evaluations during
implementation, regular external audits and ex post
evaluations;
(d)  too often the texts did not permit a clear distinction
between the contributions made by the authorities of
the recipient countries in terms of finance and in
terms of the human and material resources made
available to the projects;
32. In order to complete the range of customary
arbitration possibilities, in the Court’s view the financing
agreements ought to contain a clause stating the
consequences should one or the other of the signatories
default on his commitment.
33. As from 1992 the Commission undertook to
introduce a method of managing cycles of projects called
Project Cycle Management. This approach should allow
greater control of the management of each stage of the
project from the preparatory phase to the ex-post
evaluation. However, this approach was not followed in
the case of the projects of the Third Protocols since it
was introduced after they were drawn up. Nor was it
used in a systematic fashion for the projects financed
within the framework of the Fourth Protocols.
(14) The same problems were already pointed out by the Court in
the context of the PHARE Programme (see Special Report
No 3/97 on the decentralised system of implementation for
the PHARE Programme (from 1990-1995) (OJ C 175,
9.6.1997, paragraph 3.14).
(15)  Economic Geology Project, Jordan, Science and Technology
Project, Jordan.C 98/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Information technology
34. In its Special Report No 3/91 the lack of an
adequate system for the accounting and management of
the Protocols was highlighted (16). The situation has not
improved very much since then. First, there are
inadequate links between the Commission’s financial
accounts (SINCOM, OLAS-Budget (17)) and the RAP
application developed in-house by DG 1B for project and
financial management data concerning projects under the
Protocols. Secondly, RAP suffers from a number of
weaknesses which reduce its value as a tool for
management and control purposes. Conceptual
weaknesses include difficulties in accounting for projects
where several currencies are used, and, where a single
project is financed from more than one Protocol, the
necessity to account separately for each of these financing
components.
35. On a practical level, the lack of automatic links
between the financial accounting systems and RAP means
that the RAP database is not promptly updated. The use
made of the system, and thus the quantity and quality of
the data loaded by each Delegation varies considerably.
The deficiencies of the system, and thus the limited value
of it as a management tool, were confirmed by users in
the Delegations.
36. As a result, the monitoring and management
capacity of the Commission, especially in the Delegations
is reduced. A new system, the MIS (18), was intended to
provide the services with a powerful tool for project
monitoring and control, but was installed, in a simplified
version, only in 1997 (19)( 20).
The organisation and resources of the departments
involved
37. The preparation, implementation and monitoring of
the projects financed within the framework of the
Protocols is the task of the geographical units and the
(16)  Paragraphs 4.1 — 4.11.
(17)  OLAS-Budget is an application managed by DG VIII which
extracts and groups SINCOM payment data from different
years by commitment. Since January 1996 the production of
list and reports by DG VIII for DG 1B has ceased. OLAS
stands for ‘On-Line Accounting System’.
(18)  Management Information System.
(19)  See Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996,
paragraphs 13.22 — 13.28 (JO C 348, 18.11.1997).
(20) The Court also pointed out serious and similar weaknesses in
the computer systems used for the management of the
PHARE Programme ((see Special Report No 3/97 on the
decentralised system of implementation for the PHARE
Programme (from 1990-1995), paragraphs 4.24 — 4.28 (OJ
C 175, 9.6.1997)).
technical unit of the Mediterranean Directorate and of
the financial unit of DG IB. The Delegations set up by
the Commission in the recipient NMCs also participate
actively in the administration of the projects.
38. The division of responsibilities between the
geographical units and the technical unit in the
Mediterranean Directorate is not set out in any internal
document (21), and varies from one project to another.
Although such an approach may favour a certain
flexibility, it also creates uncertainties about the
respective responsibilities of the various units in the
management of the projects.
39. The distribution of tasks between the Commission’s
central departments and the Delegations is described in a
DG IB internal document of July 1992 (21). Basically, this
document attributes decision-making powers to the
former while the latter are given an advisory role on the
policies to be followed and on the selection of projects.
The Delegations may also, on the basis of instructions
given by headquarters, negotiate the conditions for the
implementation of the projects with local authorities. The
logic underlying the document is a very centralist one as
the central departments retain the power of decision. In
reality, the controls carried out showed that the
Delegations often accept alterations, sometimes quite
considerable ones, to the FA terms (see paragraphs 72 —
80). In addition, these changes are frequently made
without any written or supporting documentation which
would allow their justification to be examined. Whilst the
Delegations actually are best placed to appreciate the
relevance of a request for amendment which has been
entered by the administration of the projects, at the
present time no document authorises them to make this
decision. Only the signatories of a document are
empowered to amend it unless they delegate this
competence. It is therefore for the Commission to decide
to give the Delegations such powers, subject to them
providing written justification, which would allow the
Commissioner responsible to examine the decisions
taken.
(21)  A DGIB internal document of July 1992 set out the
respective responsibilities of the Delegations and Commission
headquarters relating to the management and monitoring of
development aid and economic cooperation. This document
refers explicitly to the situation of the programme in Asia
and, to a lesser extent, to the situation in Latin America. It
speaks of a future amended version which would reflect the
particular aspects of cooperation in Mediterranean countries,
but the Commission has not been able to supply the Court
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40. Furthermore, the Delegations have increasingly to
come to terms with an appreciable increase in their
workload due to their increasingly political role, the
development of their economic and commercial activities
and those tasks involving representation and the supply
of information.
41. With the resources available at present, both in
respect of the number and the qualifications of the staff,
the Delegations can only cope with this extra work by
neglecting tasks relating to financial and technical
cooperation.
42. The Commission has undertaken a thorough review
of the development and management of its external
services, which led to its approving a document on this
subject on 8 April 1997. This document expresses a
determination both to increase human resources and to
improve working methods in order to make the best use
of those resources. This document, which marks an
awareness of the necessity of decentralisation and
acknowledges that much remains to be done to remove
the weaknesses that have been noted, should be
complemented by a definition of the powers that are to
be given to the Delegations and of the procedures for
implementing those powers (22).
The consequences for the implementation of the
projects
43. The Court’s audits have identified a series of delays
in the implementation of the projects and inadequate
expertise in the financial management and monitoring of
the projects. Major amendments to the terms of the FAs
with the mere assent of the Delegations or the central
departments have also been discovered.
Schedule for the completion of the projects
44. As Table 6 shows, for six of the sixteen projects
audited, the period of time required for signing the FA,
after the decision had been taken by the Commission,
was more than 10 months and for five of them the
period was one year or longer. In two extreme cases it
was respectively 17 months and over 24 months. In
addition, in the case of several projects, an extra year or
eighteen months was necessary to select the technical
assistance unit and/or send supplies due to the growing
difficulties on the part of the Commission’s departments
in organising tendering procedures within acceptable time
limits.
TABLE 6
PERIOD OF TIME REQUIRED FOR SIGNING THE FINANCING AGREEMENTS
Recipient country EGYPT
Name of project Helwan Wastewater
Project — Phase II
Nile Valley Regional
Project
Food Sector
Development
Programme
Ras Mohammed
National Park
Financing decision 19.12.1988 9.3.1989 2.4.1990 4.10.1991
FA signed on 3.5.1989 16.10.1989 16.7.1990 28.4.1992
Time lapse 5 months 6 months 3 months 2/3 years
Recipient country JORDAN
Name of project National Soil Map and
Land Use Project
Economic Geology
Project
Ground Water
Investigation in
Hammad and Sirhan
basins
Cooperation Project in
Science and Technology
Financing decision 26.3.1989 5.12.1990 5.12.1991
FA signed on 18.4.1989 23.4.1990 21.10.1991 29.9.1992
Time lapse 13 months 11 months 10 months
(22)  Similar problems concerning the division of responsibilities
between head office in Brussels and the Delegations and the
latters’ powers were pointed out by the Court in the context
of the PHARE Programme ((see Special Report No 3/97 on
the decentralised system of implementation for the PHARE
Programme (from 1990-1995), paragraphs 2.16, 2.19 —
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Recipient country MOROCCO
Name of project Agricultural
Development Fund
(ADF)
Contribution to the
improvement of the
system of teaching
science and technology
in Morocco
Contribution to the
development of training
structures in the textile
and leather industries
Rehabilitation and
protection of parts of
the Ouarzazate and
Moulouya disaster areas
Financing decision 2.6.1989 24.10.1989 6.7.1990 2.7.1990
FA signed on 13.2.1990 26.10.1990 15.7.1991 30.7.1991
Time lapse 8 months 12 months 12 months 13 months
Recipient country TUNISIA
Name of project Agricultural
development to the
south-west of Kef
Creation of the Rijm
Maatoug palm grove
Loan operations for the
benefit of small and
medium-sized
agricultural enterprises
in Tunisia
Exploitation of water
resources in the
Governorate of
Kasserine
Financing decision 30.6.1988 27.6.1989 5.12.1990 9.7.1991
FA signed on 9.7.1988 11.8.1989 29.4.1991 30.9.1991
Time lapse 1 month 1,5 months 5 months 3 months
Source: Court of Auditors.
45. Although external factors — the Gulf crisis, for
example — may explain, in part, the delays, they were
principally caused by the Commission’s difficulties in
managing, in an efficient manner, the necessary stages in
the launch of numerous projects.
46. The audits conducted showed that the most frequent
causes of delays are the poor quality of the FAs and
inadequate grasp of the public tendering procedures. One
project involving loan operations for the benefit of small
and medium-sized agricultural enterprises in Tunisia
(SEM/03/212/015)  thus began with a delay of two years
due to the impreciseness of the FA in respect of the
procedures for the release of funds, the rate of exchange
to be applied when constituting the counterpart funds or
even the provisions for intervention by the national
accounting officer and the conditions regulating the use
of bank accounts and the interest yielded. Two projects
in Jordan also suffered such delays because of the time
required by the Commission to conclude the technical
assistance contracts in the case of the Economic geology
project (SEM/03/628/013) and to acquire the laboratory
equipment necessary for the implementation of the
Cooperation project in science and technology
(SEM/03/628/033A).
47. These delays in the launch of the projects increased
costs and sometimes affected results. Generally speaking,
they resulted in a failure to meet the deadline for the
implementation of the financial agreements for all 16
projects in the sample.
48. In Morocco construction costs increased from
58,6 Mio ECU to a total of 64 Mio ECU for a project
involving the improvement of the education system
(SEM/03/204/006) and work initially planned for a
project concerning the rehabilitation and protection of
irrigated areas in the Ouarzazate and La Moulouya
regions  (SEM/03/204/013)  could only be partially
completed.
49. In addition, within the framework of the
implementation of the project for the development of
training structures in the leather and textile industries in
Morocco  (SEM/03/204/012), 28 contracts for a
cumulative total of 2,94 Mio ECU were not approved
until after the deadline for the implementation of the
financing agreement, which, in the absence of an
additional clause to the FA extending this period, is
irregular.
Financial management and monitoring of the projects
50. The audits carried out have highlighted partial
knowledge of the situation of the projects, weaknesses in
the monitoring of the accounts of the paying agencies
and financial management which is often inadequate.C 98/15 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Knowledge of the situation of the projects
51. Under the provisions of the FAs, the projects are,
generally, jointly financed by the Commission and the
recipient countries. The Court’s audit showed that, for 12
of the 16 projects in the sample, the Commission was not
in possession of any information about the payment of
the national contribution and the use to which it is put.
With the notable exception of the «Rjim Maatoug»
project in Tunisia (SEM/03/212/010), the only cases in
which the Commission had the necessary data available
concerned projects where the local co-financing came
from counterpart funds.
52. Where responsibility for monitoring the execution of
the projects lies with the national administrations of the
NMCs and/or large financial organisations, the
Commission’s monitoring is generally at its weakest. This
weakness is accentuated in cases where a large number of
operations involving individual allocations of subsidies or
loans is being financed. Three projects in the sample fall
into this category: the project involving loan operations
for the benefit of small and medium-sized agricultural
enterprises in Tunisia (SEM/03/212/015), the project for
the improvement of the education system in Morocco
(SEM/03/204/006)  and the Agricultural Development
Fund (ADF) in Morocco (SEM/03/204/002).
53. For this last project mentioned, the Commission did
not possess, at the time of the audit, any information
about the use of the final 10 Mio ECU tranche of its
financial contribution. The reports sent by the
management contained, moreover, anomalies that the
Commission’s departments had not been able to discover,
since these reports had not been used. These anomalies
can be explained by a change in the accounting for the
operations which allowed reimbursements for purchases
made by the beneficiaries prior to approval of the FA to
be charged to it.
Administrative and financial management
Monitoring the accounts of the paying
agencies
54. Examination of the accounts of the paying agencies
showed that for two of the four countries visited as part
of the audit no reconciliation of bank accounts had been
carried out and that there were transactions in respect of
which final settlement had been pending since 1989. For
one of these countries, final settlement only took place
during the Court’s visit after joint research had been
carried out by the Court’s auditors together with
Delegation staff.
Selection of technical assistance
55. Leaving aside the problems connected with the
Commission’s difficulties in managing, within reasonable
time periods, the procedures for the selection of the
technical assistance, the Court found two projects for
which these selection procedures were questionable.
56. In the case of the project for the improvement of the
system of technical education in Morocco
(SEM/03/204/006), the Commission entrusted the
monitoring of the project’s implementation to the
consultant who carried out identification and
preparation. The Commission likewise awarded the
technical assistance contract for the execution of the
«Rjim Maatoug project» (SEM/03/212/010) to the same
consultant who carried out the feasibility study.
57. This last project is jointly financed by the
Commission, Italy and the state of Tunisia. The Italian
contribution was managed by the Commission in
accordance with a framework agreement concluded
between the Commission and the Republic of Italy in
1985. The relevant Article 2.10 of the FA names the
consultant to whom the contract must be awarded by
private treaty. This procedure, for which there is
provision in the framework agreement, is, however, only
possible provided it is also expedient. Under the terms of
the agreement, its expediency must be assessed by
reference to the principles of cost and urgency and
provided it has been the subject of an examination by the
responsible Commission departments. The Commission’s
files contain no indication that its departments conducted
such an examination.
Cash management
58. In November 1995, at the time of the Court’s audit,
of the 33,7 Mio ECU paid by the Commission for the
loan part of the Food Sector Development programme
(SEM/03/220/020A) since its launch, 9,3 Mio ECU was
still unused. On the same date, total capital repayments
and interest on loans came to 14,7 Mio and 1,6 Mio
ECU respectively. Cash-in-hand totalled 25,6 Mio ECU,
i.e. 54 % of the initial financing. The CommissionC 98/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
should have paid out the funds on the basis of a realistic
analysis of the projects’ cash-flow requirements (23).
59. In addition, for this same project, the system
established provided for the endowment of the imprest
account with an advance equivalent to 50 % of the
project’s annual requirements. Due to an overestimation
of the costs in the work schedules, the advances paid out
exceeded the requirements of the project. The balance of
unused funds on closure of the accounts at the end of the
year came to 0,8 Mio ECU in 1993 and rose to 2,8 Mio
ECU at the end of the following financial year. In 1995,
the balance available on the imprest account still
amounted to 1,2 Mio ECU.
60. 13,8 Mio Tunisian dinars (TD), i.e. 1,19 Mio ECU,
were paid as from 27 December 1991 to the Tunisian
bank which was responsible for the management of loans
within the framework of an agricultural loan project
(SEM/03/212/015) involving loan operations for the
benefit of small and medium-sized agricultural holdings,
although this credit line was not drawn upon until the
month of October 1992. Interest yielded by the sums
deposited in the accounts of the project between October
1992 and 21 November 1994, the date on which the
project funds were exhausted, amounted to 13,5 Mio
TD, i.e. 1,1 Mio ECU. The Commission did not become
aware of this amount until the Court conducted its
audit.
Payment of ineligible expenditure
61. Three cases of ineligible expenditure were revealed
during the audits, either because the operations paid for
by the Commission were concluded before the signing of
the FA or because they were only partially eligible, or
were completely ineligible, for payment from the
Community contribution.
62. Thus operations carried out before the signing of the
FA were nevertheless paid for by the Commission within
the framework of a project in Morocco. This project
involved aid for training in the textile and leather
industries (SEM/03/204/012) for which the total of
operations erroneously financed was estimated, at the
conclusion of the audit, to be 212 000 ECU.
63. In Egypt, too, two payments for a total of 705 010
ECU were charged in 1991 to the accounts of the Food
Development Sector programme (SEM/03/220/020A) for
activities for which no provision had been made, and the
(23) See the Annual Report on the financial year 1996, paragraph
13.37 (OJ C 348, 18.11.1997).
costs of which should have been charged to the
counterpart funds made available for food aid.
64. The body responsible for managing the Nile Valley
Regional Project in Egypt (SEM/03/220/008A) invoiced
the Commission for 50 % of all its administrative costs
while simultaneously managing five further projects
which were financed by other international donors. No
document supporting the invoicing of such a large
percentage to the Commission was submitted to the
Court’s auditors. The Delegation was not aware of this
situation. Complementary controls should be carried out
by the Commission’s departments to determine the
amounts wrongly paid out.
Time taken for payment
65. In the case of the «Rjim Maatoug»
(SEM/03/212/010)  project in Tunisia, the excessively long
periods of time taken for the payment of technical
assistants’ fees incurred 41 732 ECU in interest on
arrears.
66. Similarly, the Commission had to pay 40 000 ECU
in interest on arrears for the Ground water investigation
project in Azzraq (SEM/03/628/006) because of payment
delays caused by application of the wrong exchange
rate (24).
67. The contractor carrying out the Economy Geology
project  (SEM/03/628/013)  has submitted a claim for
interest due to late payment and, at the time of the
Court’s audit, an invoice was still outstanding after more
than two years. No action had been taken by the
Commission or by the Jordanian Natural Resources
Institute to resolve these matters.
68. Analysis of the time necessary for the organisation
of operations relating to the implementation of the textile
and leather industries’ training project in Morocco
(SEM/03/204/012), revealed that, in four cases, it ranged
between 121 and 221 days.
Evaluation and external audits
69. Three of the projects audited in Jordan were not
subjected to an external audit since this was not
stipulated in the FA. As for the fourth, the evaluation
carried out during implementation was too late for those
(24)  This project was not included in the sample. The point was
nevertheless identified during the mission to Jordan, where
all the projects financed for the benefit of the country could
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responsible for the project to take the results into account
before completion of the work.
70. The project concerning the improvement of the
system of teaching technology and science in Morocco
(SEM/03/204/006)  was not subjected to any evaluation or
to an external audit. The FA, moreover, does not contain
any obligation in this respect.
71. On this last point, the Court noted that the
Commission now has a tendency to include in the text of
the FA an obligation to accept external audits. The
Commission should, however, define the objectives of
these audits sufficiently precisely and improve the
follow-up in order to draw maximum benefit from them
and avoid situations like those met with in the Nile
Valley Regional Project (SEM/03/220/008A). In spite of
annual audits over five years of implementation, the
excessive invoicing of administrative costs (see paragraph
64) by the technical assistance units was never noticed.
Amendments to the initial decisions
72. Examination of the files has shown that major
amendments, or transfers of appropriations from one
budget heading to another, were accepted by the
Delegations, the management units or the technical
assistance units without the Commission having delegated
authority to these various units to do this. In addition,
these amendments took place without any written
explanation which would have allowed checks to be
carried out to see whether they were really justified.
Major amendments
73. Within the framework of the project concerning the
loan operations in favour of small and medium-sized
agricultural enterprises in Tunisia (SEM/03/212/015), the
type of the products to be imported, as stipulated in the
FA, was ignored and essential products of a different
type, to a value of almost 11 Mio ECU, were imported.
The Delegation also accepted a substantial increase in the
rates of interest on the medium-term and long-term
loans, raising them from 7,50 to 10 % and from 8 to
11 %. This last amendment increased the farmers’ debt
burden considerably and a number of them were not able
to support it (see paragraph 97).
74. Within the framework of the agricultural
development project to the south-west of Kef in Tunisia
(SEM/03/212/004), the management powers delegated by
the FA to a body with legal personality and budgetary
autonomy were transferred to a decentralised
administration which was not at liberty to invest liquid
assets.
75. In Morocco, the Agricultural Development Fund
project  (SEM/03/204/002)  for which the Commission has
paid, within the framework of the Third Protocols,
30 Mio ECU, was, according to the terms of the FA, to
have been subjected to an audit by the Moroccan General
Inspectorate of Finances for each of the three years of its
implementation. The Delegation allowed this inspection
to be replaced by an audit conducted by an external
company which only partly covered the period of
Community financing. This being the case, the correct
use of 10 Mio ECU was not audited.
Authorisation of transfers between headings
76. During the implementation of the training project in
Morocco in the textile and leather industries
(SEM/03/204/012), the Delegation agreed an increase of
37 % for the ‘training network’ component, which
thereby increased from 1,09 Mio ECU to 1,5 Mio ECU.
77. Transfers of appropriations between the budget
headings of the FA were frequently approved. In the case
of the «Rjim Maatoug» project (SEM/03/212/010), the
changes observed also concerned the origin of the funds
and the acceptance of the fact that the approved limits
under certain headings were to be exceeded.
78. Finally, in respect of the Helwan Waste Water
project  (SEM/03/220/005A)  and, generally, all the
infrastructure projects financed for the benefit of Egypt,
the Delegation charged payments as long as
appropriations remained available under the FA without
concerning themselves with the specific amounts made
available under each budgetary heading.
79. These examples show that the managing
departments too often tend to overlook the restrictions
imposed by the amounts entered in the FA and only
consider the overall budget. They are, however, largely
unaware of the rules restricting expenditure to the
appropriations allocated to each expenditure
heading (25).
80. Apart from the irregular nature of this situation, it
raises questions about the initial allocation of
appropriations which were intended to cover the
requirements identified during the preparatory studies. A
(25)  See also paragraph 15.29 of the Annual Report on the
financial year 1991 (OJ C 330, 15.12.1992).C 98/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
need to amend the amounts under the budget headings
for a project indicates a need to amend its
implementation. This is an important management
decision, which should only be taken by those authorities
which have received a proper mandate to do so (see
paragraph 39). In future the FAs should stipulate that all
applications for amendments to the initial decisions, such
as those described above, must be justified and be
approved by the authority responsible.
Services provided by the technical assistance units
81. An examination of the sample revealed the generally
high quality of the services provided by the technical
assistance. Excessive invoices for ineligible expenditure
(NVRP — see paragraph 64) or incorrect attitudes
(Helwan Waste Water — see paragraph 92) were
nevertheless observed. The following comments should
moreover be made.
82. In Morocco the services provided by the TA units
for the implementation of the pedagogical and technical
components of the project for the improvement of the
teaching of science and technology (SEM/03/204/006)
were judged to be inadequate by the Minister of
Education and by the Commission.
83. In Jordan, in the case of the Economic Geology
projet (SEM/03/628/013), the TA, due to its inability to
work in close collaboration with the local authorities, did
not lead to any strengthening of the institutions, which
constituted one of the project’s important goals. In
contrast, good cooperation between the technical
assistant and the local authorities was decisive for the
success of the National Soil Map and Land Use project
(SEM/03/628/005).
84. In addition, it was noted that when the technical
assistance replaces the local authorities responsible for
the administration and financial management of the
project, the project’s survival is in doubt if it is expected
to continue beyond the duration of the consultants’
contracts.
Management by those responsible for the projects and
results obtained
Observations in respect of the accounts and finances
85. Two of the four projects audited in Jordan did not
have separate accounts while for two others the only
accounts kept were those of the technical assistance unit.
It should be added that in the case of the National Soil
Map and Land Use project (SEM/03/628/005), the
accounts, which were kept by the TA, did not present the
appropriations under the budgetary headings stipulated
in the FA, thus making it impossible to monitor their
utilisation.
86. In the case of the Nile Valley Regional Project in
Egypt (SEM/03/220/008A), the only accounts were kept
by the technical assistance. Neither the national
coordinators for the various research programmes nor the
local research centres kept accounts.
87. In spite of the generally high quality of the
management of the «Rjim Maatoug» project
(SEM/03/212/010), the checks carried out showed that
the managers of the project did not award a local
contract for the purchase of tractors to the lowest bidder
and the files do not supply a satisfactory explanation for
this decision, which contravenes the public tendering
regulations.
The results recorded and the survival of the projects
88. The projects’ success depends on the partners
fulfilling their commitments and on an adequate system
of management, the definition of which is a result, or
should be a result, of feasibility studies. Bearing in mind
these two criteria, the controls conducted by the Court
revealed contrasting situations. The shortfall in the results
achieved compared to the objectives set out in the FAs,
and doubts about the ability of the following projects to
survive, should be emphasised.
89. The Helwan Waste Water project
(SEM/03/220/005A), which has received, commencing
with the first protocol, almost 87 Mio ECU, can still not
be taken over by the local institutions. Two
administrations share responsibility for the project.
Responsibility for the execution of the work lies with the
Cairo Waste Water Organisation (CWO) which, after its
final inspection of the work done, hands it over to the
General Organisation For Sanitary Drainage (GOSD),
which is responsible for the management of installations
and the distribution of water. Checks carried out on the
spot have shown that neither of these two institutions is
in a position to perform its tasks in an accceptable
fashion and that the project as a whole only works
thanks to the technical assistance.
90. There are two basic reasons which explain this
situation. Firstly, the GOSD was not authorised to set theC 98/19 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
price of water at an adequate level to allow it to achieve
the real budgetary autonomy which would guarantee its
financial viability without the aid of international donors.
Secondly, the poor remuneration paid by these two
institutions to their officials has led to a number of them
leaving: after having received qualifications through
vocational training from the technical assistance, they
joined the private sector as soon as they had the
opportunity, where they obtained higher salaries.
91. Such a situation robs the administrations concerned
of their capacity to fulfil their responsibilities and they
then depend completely on the technical assistance for
the smooth running of the waste water treatment system
and, ten years after the launch of the project, are
themselves still incapable of assuring its maintenance and
continuation.
92. This situation has given the technical assistance a
position of such strength that they have taken the liberty,
with the active support of GOSD, of continuing to work,
in spite of the Commission’s refusal to prolong their
contract once it had ended. At the time of the Court’s
mission to Egypt, this situation had continued for 17
months. Following the Court’s visit, the Egyptian
authorities agreed to take responsibility for the costs
arising from the extension of this contract.
93. In addition, at the time of the Court’s audit, stocks
of spare parts were inadequate for an operation of this
scale. According to the technical assistance, numerous
disappearances of equipment had occurred and the
standard of maintenance of the installations was not
adequate.
94. Constraints of the same kind inhibited the Food
Development Sector Programme project
(SEM/03/220/020A), the survival of which will be
doubtful once the European technical assistants
responsible for its management depart.
95. The Court visited the Ras Mohamed National Park
project  (SEM/03/220/025A)  some weeks before the
deadline set by the FA for the completion of the work. At
that time the buildings required to carry out the project
had still not been constructed because the government
had only just made the land required available.
96. As in the case of the Helwan Waste Water project,
the park created as part of the Ras Mohamed project was
not able to generate the financial resources necessary to
assure its survival.
97. The project involving loan operations in favour of
small and medium-sized enterprises in Tunisia
(SEM/03/212/015)  has had an unwanted effect. The
farmers’ level of indebtedness increased considerably
when rates were raised (see paragraph 73). The controls
carried out revealed that more than 80 % of the farmers
were not able to support the burden of their debts. As
national legislation forbids access to new financing if
there are delays in repayments, the result is that even the
continued existence of some agricultural holdings has
been jeopardised.
98. Two of the four projects in the sample which were
financed in Jordan only partially achieved the desired
objectives and their survival also appears fraught with
difficulties. On the other hand, the National Soil Map
and Land Use project (SEM/03/628/005) may be
considered a success as it has allowed a real transfer of
know-how to the benefit of the local departments. Two
aspects in particular account for this success: the project
was well defined from the beginning by Jordanian
technicians and the technical assistance worked in close
cooperation with them.
Conclusions in respect of the management of the
projects
99. An examination of the management of the projects
shows that the main weaknesses pointed out in the
Court’s Special Report No 3/91 still persist in spite of the
commitments to remedy them given by the Commission.
100. The inadequacy of the human resources, the lack
of clarity in the division of responsibilities between the
various departments and of competences between the
Commission’s headquarters in Brussels and its
Delegations in the field — all these aspects have
contributed to the Commission’s failure, on the whole, to
cope with the management of the projects.
101. The limitations of the management tools aggravate
this situation:
(a) the computer software that the Commission has at its
disposal does not enable it to keep real auxiliary
accounts for projects which are directly linked to the
implementation of the budget, or even accounts giving
a comprehensive view of the financial situation of
these projects;
(b) the wording of the financing agreements is not precise
enough when specifying the nature of contractual
obligations, the management framework and the
instruments for monitoring operations;
(c)  the audit contracts do not define clearly the
information that the Commission expects from
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102. The tangible increase planned for Community aid
to the NMCs, practically doubling, every year, the
amounts committed, will only aggravate the present
situation. While it is scarcely likely that the increase in
appropriations foreseen under MEDA will increase the
number of projects by the same proportion, the amounts
allocated to each of them will undoubtedly be increased
quite considerably. The first application decisions for the
MEDA Regulation tend to confirm this analysis. These
actually concern structural adjustment programme
support operations and involve amounts of between 100
and 159 Mio ECU.
103. The management systems for the projects must be
set out in the FAs on the basis of knowledge of the
administrative realities in the recipient States. Where the
administrative structures are of good quality, as is the
case in the Maghreb, the Commission ought to use them
and not attempt to impose a standard, pre-established
model which runs counter to local traditions. An attempt
to impose such a model can only lead to conflicts with
the local authorities. The audit revealed that, while the
Commission has, on the whole, avoided this error when
implementing the Protocols, certain NMCs fear that, with
the implementation of MEDA, the management of the
projects will no longer be entrusted to the responsible
local institutions but will lie with ad hoc management
units headed by co-directorates made up of European
technical assistance units and local managers.
THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS ADMINISTERED
BY THE EIB ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION AND
THE AUDIT OF THESE OPERATIONS
General presentation of the audit
104. The Mediterranean Protocols include financing
which, although it originates within the budget, is
managed by the EIB. This financing consists of
non-reimbursable aid which takes the form of interest
subsidies on loans granted by the EIB from its own
resources and of refundable aid earmarked for risk
capital operations.
105. Within the framework of the Third Protocols,
37 Mio ECU was made available for risk capital. This
amount rose to 80 Mio ECU, i.e. an increase of 216 %,
in the Fourth Protocols, underlining the growing interest
of the Euro-Mediterranean partners in this financial
instrument (26).  Tables 2a and 2b give the corresponding
amounts for the seven countries concerned. The Protocols
do not fix an overall budget for the financing of interest
subsidies (see paragraphs 137 — 138).
106. The management of interest subsidies was mainly
audited on the basis of an examination of the
Commission’s files. For the management of risk capital,
the controls were complemented by an analysis of a
sample of projects, most of which were the subject of
inspections on the spot (see Table 7). These checks
covered:
(a)  whether the use of these resources was consistent
with the objectives assigned to them in the
protocols;
(b) the quality of the management by the mandated body
by means of an examination of the structures
employed and the results obtained;
(c) the monitoring of these various operations by the
Commission.
(26)  NB: 25 Mio ECU are added to this amount outside the
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TABLE 7
PROJECTS MANAGED BY THE EIB AND EXAMINED/VISITED BY THE COURT
(Mio ECU)
Ref. Economic sector
Number
of jobs
created
Total project
cost
(Mio ECU)
EIB resources
(Mio ECU)
Risk capital
(Mio ECU)
Interest rate
subsidy
(Mio ECU)
EGYPT
SEM/03/220/012E Industry 750/800 140,0 25,0 5,5 2,1
SEM/04/220/033E
SEM/03/220/013E
Global loan via the
Export Develop. Bank
of Egypt
Tourism 5,2 2,1 0,5
Carpet ind. 400 9,7 4,0 0,6
Synthetic fibres 1,3 0,7
Tourism 6,2 0,8
SEM/03/220/030E Industry 600 77,7 15,0 9,0 1,9
SEM/04/220/029E
SEM/03/220/036E Horticulture 480 permanent 21,4 6,0 1,5 0,8
SEM/03/220/037B 800 seasonal
Total Egypt 262 54 17 5
MOROCCO
Global loans via the
Treasury
Electronics 26 1,4 0,1
Pesticides 29 1,2 0,1
Paper 26 perm. + 10 occ. 1,9 0,2
Textile 120 1,1 0,2
Marble
Steel not available 1,6 0,3
Electronics 180 1,1 0,1
Fish meal, fish oil 35 perm + 20 seas. 1,3 0,1
Leather goods 40 0,1 0,0
Clothing 150 2,0 0,2
Rm Concrete 25 1,4 0,1
Exp. polystyrene 30 0,6 0,1
Textile 155 1,5 0,2
Financing through
the SPPP
Biotechnology 40 0,7 0,3
Food 2,8 0,2
Copper industry 45 2,7 0,3
Total Morocco 21,4 2,5
TUNISIA
Global loans via
Banque Nationale de
De ´veloppement
Protocols II, III and IV
Ceramics 40 1,8 0,3
Textile 17,0 0,7
Tyre industry 500 3,5 0,7
Rubber components 65 2,0 0,1
Shoes 104 0,1 0,1
Tourism not available 2,5 0,1
Mining 250 56,0 0,9
Enamel industry 60 4,5 0,2
TOTAL RISK CAPITAL TUNISIA 87,3 3,0
SEM/03/212/016 Chemical pollution — 70,4 35,4 5,4
Total Tunisia 157,7 35,4 3,0 5,4
Source: Court of Auditors.C 98/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
107. Taking into account the number of financial
instruments, on the one hand, which the Commission has
entrusted to EIB management and, on the other, the
constraints experienced in connection with the
organisation of the external audit of the EIB, the
obligation to organise, systematically, a joint audit with
the EIB, represents a real constraint on the Court. For
this reason, it was materially impossible to carry out
controls, on the spot, on a large number of projects
which had benefited from budget finance in the form of
interest-rate subsidies.
The system of risk capital management
The purpose of risk capital and conditions of eligibility
108. Risk capital is, according to the terms of the
Protocols, intended primarily to help in making equity
capital or the like available to private and public
undertakings, in particular those in which natural or legal
persons from Member States of the Community have
participations. They are available to all sectors of the
economies of the NMCs.
109. The extremely broad formulation of the Protocols
led the EIB to define three conditions for the eligibility of
projects for risk capital. Two of these conditions concern
the actual qualities of the projects, i.e. their economic
value and their financial viability. The third concerns the
decisive role which risk capital must play in the execution
of the project.
110. The EIB, however, interprets this final condition
very generously. It is considered to be fulfilled when the
absence of this financing would lead to delays in the
operation, to an upset in the balance of the relationship
between the local and European partners or would
influence other hesitant donors unfavourably.
Description of the management system
111. This system is built around financing procedures
within a contractual framework and procedures for the
launching and monitoring of the projects which are
adapted to suit each one of them.
Financing procedures and contractual framework
112. The EIB took care to adapt the means of
intervention employed to the realities of the NMCs. Five
methods were therefore tried out, as single alternatives or
together, one after the other, in order to achieve the best
possible adaptation to local realities.
113. These procedures, presented by the EIB in an
information note dated 24 June 1992, are:
(a)  a global loan to a selected financial institution
intermediary (IFI) (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan);
(b) a global loan to the national exchequer working in
cooperation with several IFIs (Morocco);
(c) creation of special financial companies;
(d) direct intervention in the projects (Egypt);
(e) the financing of feasibility studies.
114. The legal framework put in place by the Bank was
different for each procedure, in order to adapt it to their
particular characteristics. Notwithstanding this diversity,
the management of risk capital is generally characterised
by the following factors:
(a)  financing is always granted at more advantageous
rates than those obtained on the local market;
(b)  the risk of exchange losses is not borne by the
beneficiary, but is charged to the Community initially
then subsequently to the NMC concerned;
(c)  the definitive granting of finance to the final
beneficiary may not take place without the EIB’s
express agreement.
115. As in the case of its own operations, the EIB
ensures that the clauses of the contract are incorporated
harmoniously into local law.
Appraisal and monitoring of projects
116. When the EIB uses its own resources to finance a
project jointly with risk capital, its departments appraise
the file, which is drawn up according to its usual internal
procedures, directly.
117. In contrast, when the management of the
operations takes place within the framework of the
implementation of a global line of credit, the appraisal of
the project follows a decentralised procedure. The IFI
must first submit an application.
118. Nevertheless, the IFI does not have autonomous
powers of decision in respect of the allocation of risk
capital. It must send the file relating to the project and
the result of its appraisal to the EIB to obtain its
approval. This file contains, at the least, according to the
terms of the contract, a standardised information sheet.C 98/23 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
119. After examination of the forwarded file, the EIB
takes an allocation decision by which the IFI is
authorised to conclude the financing contract with the
final beneficiary.
120. The monitoring of the operations is conducted
according to two complementary procedures. Contracts
signed with the IFI provide for monitoring of
documentation, whereby information on the state of their
risk capital portfolio and on the financial situation of
each beneficiary is sent to the EIB on a regular basis. This
information is collated in standardised sheets, a specimen
of which is attached to the contract. This monitoring is
complemented by inspections on the spot which the EIB
carries out directly or by despatching consultants
recruited specifically for this purpose.
121. In the case of the global lines of credit granted to
the State of Morocco, its Treasury ensures, prior to the
release of the funds, that the contractual conditions have
been fulfilled by the beneficiary. In parallel with this, it
monitors the projects by examining the financial balance
sheets which are sent to it.
The Court’s observations at the conclusion of the audit
The appraisal of the projects
122. The most commonly encountered weakness
concerned the information collated on the European
companies associated with the joint enterprise, whose
exact situation and the extent of whose commitment
cannot be assessed on the basis of the material contained
in the appraisal files forwarded to the Court. The
controls carried out demonstrated the close connection
between the quality of the partners involved and the
success or, on the contrary, failure of the projects
financed.
123. The second weakness demonstrated by an analysis
of the projects in the sample and by an examination of
the available documents, concerns the relative frequency
of under-estimation of the investment budgets and, in
particular, of the working capital requirements.
124. Apart from these two weaknesses, the quality of
the appraisal files varies. An examination of files
appraised by the EIB’s offices directly, or by the Tunisian
IFI, or by the investment company created in Morocco,
shows the high quality of the appraisal work. In contrast,
the poor quality of the files forwarded in support of
applications for the allocation of funds by the other IFIs
visited as part of the inquiry, reflects, depending on the
individual case, the absence or lack of experience on the
part of these institutions in the management of this type
of operation.
Concentration of aid
125. Of the eight projects selected in Tunisia, the IFI
was itself the beneficiary for half of them, receiving an
amount in excess of more than 60 % of the total
allocation.
126. In Morocco, according to information received
from the supervisory authorities, the beneficiaries of the
risk capital came mainly from amongst the usual
customers of the IFIs.
127. In Egypt, three projects absorbed 16,5 Mio ECU of
the 27 Mio made available under the Third and Fourth
Protocols. This concentration of allocations is also special
because of the size of the projects financed, one of them
representing a total investment of 140 Mio ECU, of the
size of the European partners involved, the majority of
which are multinational companies, and of the
commitment by the EIB of its own resources in these
operations.
128. Such concentrations are questionable, in spite of
the undeniable economic importance of the projects
financed in Egypt in the light of the objectives laid down
for risk capital by the Protocols and indicative
programmes concluded with these countries. The fact is
that, according to the terms of the latter, small and
medium-sized enterprises constitute the favoured target
group for risk capital. However, the only operations
aimed at benefiting these enterprises were financed by
two global loans, of which the first, under the Third
Protocol, was only partially used and the second, under
the Fourth Protocol, had not been the subject of any
allocation at the time of the Court’s audit.
129. According to the EIB, the portfolio of projects
financed in Egypt is sound and reflects its concern to
manage the resources entrusted to it by the Commission
as well as possible, taking into account the possibilities
offered by the local market. Without disputing this claim,
the Court notes a contradiction with the commitments
made in the indicative programmes.
130. One NMC’s responsible authorities underlined,
moreover, that the basic value of this financial instrument
was to allow the implementation of quality projects
which, however, were difficult to finance by conventional
bank loans because of the impossibility on the part of
their sponsors of offering sufficient guarantees. The
purpose of the risk capital, therefore, is to encourage the
creation of a new generation of entrepreneurs, which was
not really the case for the projects financed in Egypt and
was only partly the case for those financed in Morocco
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Overall monitoring of the operations by the EIB
131. As far as the monitoring of documents is
concerned, it was observed that, in general, the IFIs did
not fulfil their contractual obligations in respect of
forwarding to the EIB, on a regular basis, information
sheets on the state of their risk capital portfolio or on the
financial situation of each beneficiary.
132. In May 1993 the EIB employed a consultant, at its
own expense, to evaluate operations financed in Morocco
on the basis of a large sample covering 37 projects.
Several of the projects examined as part of the Court’s
audit had also been evaluated by this consultant or had
been audited by the EIB. The Court found similarities in
the findings of these audits.
The results achieved
133. The management of risk capital within the
framework of the implementation of the Third Protocols
is characterised by:
(a) an even distribution of the loans to the beneficiaries
in the various sectors of activity in the NMCs,
particularly in Morocco and Tunisia, where seven and
nine sectors of activity respectively have benefited
from this financial instrument;
(b) a leverage effect on investments, whereby the priority
given to the creation of joint enterprises has
encouraged an inflow of foreign capital;
(c) the creation of 5 200 jobs, directly, in Morocco and
more that 1 900 in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, in
these latter two countries, two other audited
operations were able to save respectively 400 and 500
jobs which were under threat;
(d)  a selection of projects designed to improve the
balance of foreign trade.
The implementation of the Fourth Protocols
134. Within the framework of the Third Protocols, the
finance granted through the global loans, with the
exception of the finance granted to the IFIs themselves,
had taken the form of long-term loans offered at rates of
interest below those on the local market. It was clear, at
the time of the audits, that this was the main reason for
their success.
135. The conditions for the allocation of finance within
the framework of the Fourth Protocols demonstrate the
determination to emphasise the risk capital component by
encouraging participations which yield dividends, and the
determination to increase the priority given to the
formation of joint ventures with European partners.
There were difficulties in the application of these new
procedures in Morocco and Tunisia and this explains the
poor utilisation of the credit lines agreed within the
framework of the Fourth Protocols (see Table 8).C 98/25 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
TABLE 8
THIRD & FOURTH PROTOCOLS — RISK CAPITAL AS AT 31.12.96
(Mio ECU)
Country Ref. Loan Definition Committed Disbursed Cancelled Balance
ALGERIA SEM/03/208/025/E Direct 3,0 0,9 0,0 2,2
SEM/03/208/026/E Direct 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,8
TOTAL ALGERIA 3rd PROTOCOLS 4,0 1,0 0,0 3,0
MOROCCO SEM/03/204/008/C Global loan 9,0 9,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/204/010/E Venture capital 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/204/011/E Venture capital 1,5 1,2 0,0 0,3
TOTAL MOROCCO 3rd PROTOCOLS 11,0 10,7 0,0 0,3
SEM/04/204/006/E Global loan 20,0 10,0 0,0 10,0
TOTAL MOROCCO 4th PROTOCOLS 20,0 10,0 0,0 10,0
TOTAL MOROCCO 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 31,0 20,7 0,0 10,3
TUNISIA SEM/03/212/008/E Global loan 3,0 2,9 0,0 0,1
SEM/03/212/013/E Global loan 3,0 2,5 0,0 0,5
TOTAL TUNISIA 3rd PROTOCOLS 6,0 5,4 0,0 0,6
SEM/04/212/005/E Global loan 7,0 3,0 0,0 4,0
SEM/04/212/016/E Global loan 8,0 1,5 0,0 6,5
TOTAL TUNISIA 4th PROTOCOLS 15,0 4,5 0,0 10,5
TOTAL TUNISIA 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 21,0 9,8 0,0 11,2
EGYPT SEM/03/220/012/E Direct 3,0 3,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/220/013/E Global loan 3,0 0,5 2,5 0,0
SEM/03/220/022/E Direct 2,0 2,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/220/030/E Direct 3,0 3,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/220/036/E Direct 1,5 1,5 0,0 0,0
TOTAL EGYPT 3rd PROTOCOLS 12,5 10,0 2,5 0,0
SEM/04/220/013/E Global loan 6,0 0,0 0,0 6,0
SEM/04/220/029/E Direct 6,0 6,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/04/220/033/E Direct 2,5 0,0 0,0 2,5
TOTAL EGYPT 4th PROTOCOLS 14,5 6,0 0,0 8,5
TOTAL EGYPT 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 27,0 16,0 2,5 8,5
JORDAN SEM/03/628/011/E Global loan 1,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/628/037/E Global loan 1,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
TOTAL JORDAN 3rd PROTOCOLS 2,0 2,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/04/628/012/E Global loan 2,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
TOTAL JORDAN 4th PROTOCOLS 2,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
TOTAL JORDAN 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 4,0 3,0 0,0 1,0
LEBANON SEM/03/604/009/E Global loan 1,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
TOTAL LEBANON 3rd PROTOCOLS 1,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
SEM/04/604/007/E Global loan 2,0 0,0 0,0 2,0
TOTAL LEBANON 4th PROTOCOLS 2,0 0,0 0,0 2,0
TOTAL LEBANON 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 3,0 0,0 0,0 3,0
3rd PROTOCOLS Venture capital 2,0 1,7 0,0 0,3
Direct loans 13,5 10,5 0,0 3,0
Global loans 21,0 16,9 2,5 1,6
TOTAL 3rd PROTOCOLS 36,5 29,0 2,5 5,0
4th PROTOCOLS Direct loans 8,5 6,0 0,0 2,5
Global loans 45,0 15,4 0,0 29,5
TOTAL 4th PROTOCOLS 53,5 21,4 0,0 32,0
VENTURE CAPITAL 2,0 1,7 0,0 0,3
DIRECT LOANS 22,0 16,5 0,0 5,5
GLOBAL LOANS 66,0 32,3 2,5 31,2
GRAND TOTAL 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 90,0 50,5 2,5 37,0
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136. In addition, because of the structure of the local
SMEs, which are often family enterprises, the twin
objectives of helping to increase their capital funds while
encouraging the creation of joint ventures, are often
difficult to reconcile with the diffidence shown towards
acceptance of a foreign partner. The local authorities
recommend dividing the credit lines into two parts so
that some of the funds will be reserved for local sponsors
who do not wish to participate in joint ventures.
The management of interest-rate subsidies
Introduction
137. Non-reimbursable aid charged to the general
budget of the Community as stipulated in the Protocols
may be used to subsidise, up to a limit of 2 %, the rates
of interest applied by the EIB to the loans it grants from
its own resources. In contrast to the situation regarding
risk capital, the Protocols do not mention the amounts
which may be allocated in the form of interest
subsidies.
138. In its Special Report No 3/91 the Court criticised
the powers conferred on the EIB by the Regulation of
1986 in respect of financing decisions relating to interest
subsidies. For this reason, non-reimbursable budgetary
resources were mainly allocated according to the EIB’s
requirements. Council Regulation No 1762/92 corrected
this but was not applied until the implementation of the
Fourth Protocols.
Audit findings
Budgetary data
139. The implementation of the Third and Fourth
Protocols in favour of the seven countries concerned by
this audit resulted in total commitments, as at 31
December 1996, of 114,7 Mio ECU in commitment
appropriations, of which 58,2 Mio ECU had been paid.
In addition, 5,3 Mio ECU in committed appropriations,
had lapsed. At the close of the accounts for the financial
year 1996, the balance of appropriations committed and
not paid in interest-rate subsidies for the overall budgets
of the Third and Fourth Protocols came to 51,1 Mio
ECU, i. e. 44,5 % of the total committed (Table 9).
TABLE 9
THIRD & FOURTH PROTOCOLS — INTEREST RATE SUBSIDIES AS AT 31.12.96
(Mio ECU)
Country Ref.
Interest Rate Subsidy
Committed Disbursed Cancelled Balance
ALGERIA — ————
EGYPT SEM/03/220/011/B 3,0 2,8 0,2 0,0
SEM/03/220/014/E 6,4 5,3 1,1 0,0
SEM/03/220/015/B 0,9 0,8 0,2 0,0
SEM/03/220/016/B 5,6 3,3 2,3 0,0
SEM/03/220/017/B 2,8 2,1 0,7 0,0
SEM/03/220/027/B 3,8 3,5 0,0 0,3
SEM/03/220/029/B 1,9 1,7 0,0 0,3
SEM/03/220/037/B 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,8
SEM/03/220/038/B 7,9 6,3 0,0 1,5
SEM/03/220/041/B 2,7 0,0 2,7
TOTAL EGYPT 3rd PROTOCOLS 35,8 25,7 4,5 5,6
SEM/04/220/001/B 1,7 0,0 0,0 1,7
SEM/04/220/007/B 4,9 4,9 0,0 0,0
SEM/04/220/009/B 7,4 0,9 0,0 6,5
SEM/04/220/012/B 3,4 0,0 0,0 3,4
SEM/04/220/023/B 5,4 2,7 0,0 2,7
SEM/04/220/032/B 7,6 0,0 0,0 7,6
TOTAL EGYPT 4th PROTOCOLS 30,4 8,5 0,0 21,9
TOTAL EGYPT 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 66,2 34,2 4,6 27,4C 98/27 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
(Mio ECU)
Country Ref.
Interest Rate Subsidy
Committed Disbursed Cancelled Balance
JORDAN SEM/03/628/008/B 2,1 1,5 0,6 0,0
SEM/03/628/009/B 1,2 1,2 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/628/010/B 1,1 1,0 0,0 0,1
SEM/03/628/018/B 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,3
SEM/03/628/030/B 1,4 1,3 0,1 0,0
SEM/03/628/034/B 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/628/036/B 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/628/039/B 1,0 0,9 0,0 0,1
SEM/03/628/040/B 0,8 0,8 0,0 0,0
TOTAL JORDAN 3rd PROTOCOLS 8,7 7,5 0,7 0,5
SEM/04/628/002/B 2,3 0,4 0,0 1,9
SEM/04/628/003/B 0,6 0,4 0,0 0,2
SEM/04/628/004/B 0,7 0,6 0,0 0,1
SEM/04/628/010/B 1,2 1,1 0,0 0,0
SEM/04/628/014/B 2,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
SEM/04/628/018/B 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
SEM/04/628/020/B 2,7 1,0 0,0 1,7
SEM/04/628/021/B 0,9 0,4 0,0 0,5
SEM/04/628/026/B 1,5 0,0 0,0 1,5
TOTAL JORDAN 4th PROTOCOLS 11,9 5,0 0,0 6,9
TOTAL JORDAN 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 20,6 12,5 0,7 7,3
LEBANON — ————
MOROCCO — ————
SYRIA SEM/03/608/013/B 6,1 0,0 0,0 6,1
TOTAL SYRIA 3rd PROTOCOLS 6,1 0,0 0,0 6,1
SEM/04/608/001/B 6,9 0,0 0,0 6,9
TOTAL SYRIA 4th PROTOCOLS 6,9 0,0 0,0 6,9
TOTAL SYRIA 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 13,0 0,0 0,0 13,0
TUNISIA SEM/03/212/005/B 1,4 1,2 0,0 0,2
SEM/03/212/006/B 1,4 1,4 0,0 0,0
SEM/03/212/011/B 2,4 2,2 0,0 0,2
SEM/03/212/016/B 5,4 5,1 0,0 0,3
SEM/03/212/018/B 4,4 1,7 0,0 2,7
TOTAL TUNISIA 3rd PROTOCOLS 14,9 11,6 0,0 3,3
GRAND TOTAL 3rd PROTOCOLS 65,5 44,8 5,3 15,4
GRAND TOTAL 4th PROTOCOLS 49,2 13,6 0,0 35,6
GRAND TOTAL 3rd & 4th PROTOCOLS 114,7 58,3 5,3 51,1
Source: Court of Auditors.C 98/28 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Dormant commitments and monitoring
140. An examination of the Commission’s files revealed
the existence of a large volume of commitment
appropriations which were either tied up prematurely or
represented an amount in excess of the requirements of
the operations concerned.
141. This phenomenon demonstrates the weakness of
the Commission’s monitoring: it did not carry out the
necessary controls to check whether the amount
committed was justified and did not set up a procedure
for the closure of completed projects at the end of each
year.
Premature tying-up of commitment
appropriations
142. Overall, the Court’s examination of the
Commission’s accounts showed that appropriations
committed and amounting to 27,5 Mio ECU remained
unused over periods exceeding two years. These amounts,
as  Table 10b shows, derived from seven projects, in
respect of four of which, at the time of the audit, no
payments had been made.
INTEREST-RATE SUBSIDIES — DORMANT COMMITMENTS
TABLE 10a
Residual amounts to be decommitted
Country
2nd Protocols 3rd Protocols 4th Protocols
Ref.
Amount
(Mio ECU)
Ref.
Amount
(Mio ECU)
Ref.
Amount
(Mio ECU)
Egypt SEM/03/220/029 0,25 SEM/04/220/007 0,01
Jordan SEM/628/02/034 0,10 SEM/03/628/010 0,08
SEM/628/02/035 0,07 SEM/03/628/018 0,28
SEM/03/628/034 0,01
SEM/03/628/036 0,03
SEM/03/628/039 0,07
Tunisia SEM/03/212/005 0,19
SEM/03/212/011 0,16
Total 0,17 1,07 0,01
Grand total 1,25
TABLE 10b
Delayed utilisation of appropriations committed
Country
3rd Protocols 4th Protocols
Ref.
Amount
(Mio ECU)
Commitment
date
First
payment
Ref.
Amount
(Mio ECU)
Date of
commitment
First payment
Egypt SEM/03/220/037 0,75 24.11.1992 — SEM/04/220/009 7,40 1.12.1993 11.7.1996
SEM/04/220/012 3,39 28.7.1994 —
Jordan SEM/04/628/002 2,31 29.12.1992 13.2.1996
SEM/04/628/003 0,65 23.3.1993 10.8.1996
Syria SEM/03/608/013 6,10 3.5.1995 — SEM/04/608/001 6,87 3.5.1995 —
Total 6,85 20,61
Grand total 27,46
Source: Court of Auditors.C 98/29 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Unexpended balances to be decommitted
143. The Court’s review of the operations financed with
interest-rate subsidies within the framework of the Third
and Fourth Protocols, and also of the Second, showed
that appropriations corresponding to projects for which
the EIB had made the final payment and informed the
Commission were still open in the Commission’s
accounts with unexpended balances of very long
standing. In one case, the last payment was made in
1990.
144. Table 10a shows that eleven projects, accounting
for almost 1,25 Mio ECU, fall within this category, one
unexpended balance of 168 320 ECU even deriving from
two commitments made under the Second Protocols with
Jordan. The setting-up of a systematic procedure for the
annual closure of operations would enable such a
situation, where appropriations are frozen to no useful
purpose and merely congest the accounts, to be
avoided.
145. Audits carried out in Egypt confirmed this analysis.
In two of the three projects concerned, the amount
committed was, for one of them, over 700 000 ECU, or
25 % too high, and for the other it was over 250 000
ECU, or 13 % too high. In the first case the unused and
unneeded funds remained blocked from March 1994
onwards, in the second, from December 1992 onwards.
In both cases the funds in question were still in the
account as ‘restant à liquider’ (still outstanding) at the
end of 1995, and were carried over until 1996 and
decommitted in July only in the first case.
146. In the third case, the initial EIB own resources loan
was fixed at 35 Mio ECU, with an estimated interest rate
subsidy of 5,6 Mio ECU. At the end of 1993, the bank
decided to reduce the size of its loan to 28 Mio ECU, as
the promoter had reduced the scale of the project, but
did not inform the Commission of this until June 1994.
The Commission, however, failed to take action at this
point to reduce the funds committed for the interest rate
subsidy. A balance of over 3 Mio ECU remained
committed throughout 1994 and 1995, with a final
payment being made in December 1995. It was not until
July 1996 that the remaining funds were decommitted.
Again, this project provides evidence of a lack of
sufficiently close management of budgetary funds by the
Commission’s services. The bank should also have
informed the Commission more promptly of its decision
to reduce the size of its loan.
Observations relating to the management of interest-rate
subsidies
147. The findings described above demonstrate the poor
quality of the controls of the justification for the amounts
requested by the EIB for interest-rate subsidies. The
Commission did not ask for any explanation of the initial
amount, of the reasons for the existence of an
unexpended balance at the end of an operation, or, on
the other hand, of the reasons which led the EIB to
request an increase in the appropriations initially
committed. The weakness of the Commission’s
monitoring is confirmed by the number of unexpended
balances to be decommitted and the length of time they
have been in existence.
148. Council Regulation (EEC) No 1762/92 restored to
the Commission control over financing decisions relating
to interest-rate subsidies. It is for the Commission to use
it to ensure that the application file submitted by the EIB
allows the Commission to check whether the
appropriations requested are justified in principle and in
terms of the amount.
149. Furthermore, the Commission should set up a
procedure for the annual closure of projects and the
cancellation of unexpended balances, as the Court has
regularly recommended both in this and other fields (27).
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Considerations relating to the system of Protocols
150. The considerations produced by the Court on
examining the implementation of the first two series of
Protocols in its Special Report No 3/91, are still
valid (28).
151. The right acquired by the recipient countries to the
amounts set out in the Protocols for an unlimited period
has meant that a smooth progression from one Protocol
to the next has not been possible and that budgetary
resources have been tied up which could have been used
for other purposes. At the same time, the Commission
found itself obliged to manage all four series of Protocols
as from 1992. This situation will persist until the
appropriations allocated to the various Protocols are
exhausted and will run parallel to the management of the
aid governed by the MEDA Regulation. In view of this
situation, the Commission plans, on the basis of the
Third and Fourth Protocols, annual payments of
approximately 200 Mio ECU up to 1999, with payments
of smaller amounts in the years following until the
appropriations are exhausted (29).
(27)  See, in particular, paragraph 3.18 onwards of the Special
Report accompanying the Statement of Assurance for the
financial year 1994 (OJ C 252, 30.12.1995).
(28) See Special Report No 3/91, and particularly paragraph 3.23
onwards (OJ C 252, 26.9.1991).
(29)  See the remarks on Item B7-4051, general budget of the
European Union for the financial year 1997 (OJ L 44,
14.2.1997).C 98/30 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
152. The MEDA Regulation tackles the problem of the
use of funds by adopting a procedure which can respond
flexibly to the absorptive capacity of the recipient
non-Member countries while respecting their priorities. In
fact, the terms of this Regulation are such that the NMCs
will no longer acquire a right to an amount from the
budget but will negotiate a plan, the indicative nature of
which is underlined, to run for a period of three years.
Considerations relating to the Commission’s system of
management
153. DG IB’s management suffers from the inadequacy
of its human resources, a lack of clarity in the division of
tasks between the departments and of competences
between the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels and
the Delegations. The powers of the Delegations should be
increased to allow them to take, in good time, decisions
which may prove necessary for the management of the
projects. These increased powers should go hand in hand
with the obligation to justify these decisions.
154. The quality of the financing agreements must be
improved from a legal point of view by making provision
for penalties when obligations are not fulfilled by the
beneficiary, and from a technical point of view by a
better description of the management bodies and of the
contents of the implementation reports and the automatic
inclusion of a clause providing for an evaluation when
the project is 50 % complete, for a final evaluation on
completion and also for an external audit.
155. The computer tools at the Commission’s disposal
do not allow auxiliary accounts to be kept for the
projects which are directly linked to the implementation
of the budget, or detailed monitoring of the projects to
be carried out. The secondary commitments, which the
contracts concluded when applying the FA represent,
must still be subjected to manual monitoring. The
Management Information System (MIS) was installed in a
simplified version in 1997.
156. The cumulative effect of these various
shortcomings has led to insufficient control, on the part
of the Commission, over the overall cycle of management
of the projects and particularly their implementation. The
rationalisation of the Commission’s system of
management, which began with the application of the
Management Cycle Project, must be intensified and
completed.
157. This situation is particularly worrying at a time
when, with the adoption of the MEDA Regulation, the
Commission’s departments are confronted with a
perceptible increase in the volume of the budget which
they have to manage and which, in commitment
apppropriations, is approximately double that of the
Protocols. To this end, amending budget No 1/96
provided for the possibility of using up to 3 % of MEDA
appropriations for administrative and technical support.
In addition, the change of approach under MEDA could
completely upset the pattern of relations between the
Community and the NMCs and exacerbate competition
between the latter.
158. From the experience gained from the
implementation of the Protocols (see paragraph 103), it
appears that for the management of finances after the
MEDA Regulation, the Commission should base its
work, whenever possible, on the administrative structures
in place in the NMCs and not seek to impose a
preconceived standard model.
Considerations relating to the operations managed by
the EIB on behalf of the Commission
159. The controls carried out showed clearly, in spite of
the weaknesses in the set-up procedures of certain IFIs,
the quality of the system established for the management
of risk capital and could be awarded full marks for the
results obtained. The implementation of risk capital gave
rise, however, to an excessive concentration of finances.
160. The Commission’s monitoring of those operations
entrusted to EIB management was poor. This poor
quality is displayed in the minimal use made of the
informative documents sent by the EIB and, in the case of
interest-rate subsidies, by the volume of dormant
commitments.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 29
January 1998.
For the Court of Auditors
Bernhard FRIEDMANN
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COMMISSION REPLIES
THE SYSTEM OF PROTOCOLS
Implementation of protocols
Budgetary presentation
21. The Commission and the Budget Authority have in
preparing and establishing the annual budget, sought to
maintain a balance between the proliferation and the
consolidation of budget lines whilst maintaining the
transparency of the objectives of actions funded.
Community legality
23. With respect to decisions regarding interest rate
subsidies, while there is a theoretical possibility for the
Commission opinion to be overruled, in fact this has
never happened.
As the Court notes Regulation 1762/92 has rectified the
situation.
24. Pursuant to Article 209 of the Treaty, the opinion of
the Court must be obtained by the Council in three
specific cases. The Commission does not consider that the
MEDA Regulation comes directly under any of these
headings.
However, under the terms of an agreement concluded in
1980, the Commission has the possibility of consulting
the Court on any proposals involving significant changes
to the techniques of financial and/or budgetary
mechanisms.
In future the Commission will more systematically
recommend the Council to obtain the Court’s prior
opinion.
Conclusions on the system of protocols
28. See paragraph 24.
OPERATIONS MANAGED DIRECTLY BY THE
COMMISSION
Management and monitoring instruments
Financing agreements
31.-33. The Commission will examine the Court’s
recommendations. The Commission agrees that the
financing agreements in general could have been
improved and the introduction of Project Cycle
Management (PCM) has lead to a better definition and
follow-up of the project.
Project Cycle Management training courses were
organised with the assistance of outside consultants from
1992 to 1997. Project leaders have gradually learned this
method of project management.
Information technology
34.-36. Further efforts are being undertaken to continue
to develop financial management and information tools
for project monitoring and control.
Organisation and available tools
37.-43. In the period covered by the Court’s audit, the
Commission’s administrative structures relating to
bilateral aid have changed greatly. The division of
responsibilities between the headquarters and its
delegations is under constant review. For tendering,
contracts and local payments, the revised rules have
allowed the delegations to maintain their flexibility. With
the creation of MEDA teams, the delegations’ ability to
monitor projects will be enhanced. Within the
headquarters the separation of responsibilities covering
conception, resourcing, management, and evaluation of
projects, has been inspired by the SEM 2000 initiative
and the principles underlying project cycle management.
The review of bilateral aid has lead to securing extra
resources for the implementation and follow-up of
projects under the MEDA Regulation. Where
appropriate, Commission staff have been reminded of
and been provided with guidelines relating to their
obligations in the management of contracts and financing
agreements. The effect of the consequences alluded by the
Court in its paragraph 42 will be reduced as the culture
of financial discipline created by the SEM 2000 initiative
gains ground.
The distribution of tasks between the geographical and
technical units and the delegations is consistent with the
work carried out in Directorate-General IB, which seeks
to draw up new rules to establish as precisely as possibleC 98/32 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
the mode of cooperation between headquarters’
departments and Commission delegations in the field of
economic cooperation and development aid.
Schedule for the completion of projects
44.-47. With respect to the Economic Geology Project:
the Commission Decision was taken on 23/3/89 and
following preparatory work the Financing Agreement was
sent for signature on 14/11/89 and eventually
countersigned on 23.4.90. The delay of 13 months was
accounted for in equal part by the need to complete
administrative procedures in both the Commission and
the beneficiary country.
The Commission is aware of the problem identified by
the Court and has included in the proposal to amend the
financial regulation that financing agreements be signed
at least within the year following the year in which the
Commission Decision is taken. This measure is designed
to encourage the recipients to ensure their national
procedures are completed within a set time-limit, when
agreeing to the conditions governing the grant of aid.
46. The ‘administrative technical provisions’ (DTA)
which are a part of a financing agreement, are often
subject of difficult and sensitive negotiations with the
beneficiary states notably to ensure the transparency of
rules and security of Community funds.
The financing agreements which the Court refers to, were
drafted in the late 80’s and early 90’s.
With the creation in July 1995, of the Finance and
Resources Directorate, as the counter-weight required by
the SEM 2000 initiative, progress has been made to
standardise and complete the financing agreements and
these now include most of the suggestions made by the
Court.
Concerning the rules relating to tendering and
contractual procedures, the Commission has issued
detailed rules and guidelines to staff dealing with
Community projects. These rules are updated regularly as
well as when the circumstances demand.
48.-49. The Commission is aware that major
construction and social infrastructure projects often have
a tendency to overshoot their original cost estimates. In
the field of cooperation aid covered by preferential
agreement, the project is managed primarily by the
country and the Commission has taken appropriate
measures to ensure that projects proceed correctly in the
light of changing circumstances — economic, social and
technical. Now, concerning the financing agreements, the
Commission has measures in place to ensure that the
expiry date is monitored with greater care, and changed
to reflect the circumstances.
Financial management and monitoring of projects
51.-53. The Commission agrees that the progress reports
should be followed with fuller effect. In keeping with the
principles of mutual trust underlying the provision of
external aid, the Commission endeavours to ensure that
the recipient state or the financial institution monitors the
amounts contributed by the recipient.
The Commission through its representative ensures that
monitoring systems are updated to reflect changing
requirements. Nevertheless, the Commission headquarters
receives regular reports on the projects’ progress. With
the increased resources available under the MEDA
Regulation, the Commission foresees the improvement in
the follow-up of project progress reports.
52. Wherever possible, the Commission aims to use
national structures to promote the concept of ownership.
The introduction of six-monthly inspection visits
currently planned under the MEDA programme, should
considerably reinforce the monitoring of projects.
Administrative and financial management
Monitoring the accounts of the paying
agencies
54. The Commission is aware of the problem cited by
the Court and, following the creation of DG IB, has
reallocated personnel to reconcile the Paying Agent
accounts. Furthermore, the Commission has procedures
in place to ensure that the reconciliation will, in future,
be made on a quarter basis. The process to ensure that
the backlog is cleared is well advanced, except for those
countries where the access to information is difficult
notably due to political difficulties.C 98/33 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Selection of technical assistance
55. The responsibility for selection of technical
assistance has now been passed to the recently created
Finance and Resources Directorate of DG IB.
In separating the initiation, selection, implementation and
evaluation functions, the Commission has reinforced
internal control thereby ensuring procedures are not only
transparent but also effective. Furthermore, new
tendering procedures with revised limits have been issued
to staff dealing with projects.
56.-57. See remarks for paragraph 55.
Cash management
59. Generally, such projects are often implemented
under difficult circumstances and it is essential that the
project management adopts a prudent but positive
approach. The work programme and cost estimates
reflected this approach. During the implementation of the
work programme and cost estimate, the PMU is obliged
to closely control the achievements and expenditures.
60. The interest generated by loan operations could be
re-used on the basis of an agreement with the
administration inspired by the findings/conclusions of the
six-monthly inspection visits.
Payment of ineligible expenditure
61.-62. The Commission is sensitive to the fact that
payments are made for costs which are eligible. The
eligibility is determined, inter alia, by the fact that the
expenditure falls due after the commitment of
appropriations has been finalised. The financing
agreement could therefore allow costs which were
incurred between the commitment of appropriations and
the operative date of the financing agreement.
The Commission agrees that for the project
SEM/03/204/212, the ECU 212 000 portion of a total
payment of ECU 452 488 was for aid to the section of
the project which predated the signature date of the
Financing Agreement. When the training, for which the
grant was destined, started (September 1990), the
Commission (6 July 1990) had decided to support the
project and the appropriations required to fund the
project had been committed already.
63. The unforeseen activity noted by the Court relates
to the urgent need to control the spread of vector
through the distribution, in Libya, of live but sterilised
screw worms imported from America. This activity had
the agreement of the Member States and Egypt. The
Commission provided ECU 700 000 from the Food
Sector Development Programme (FSDP) to purchase
urgently needed insecticides for the preventive control of
animals along the Libyan/Egyptian border. The amount
advanced was to be reimbursed by the Food Aid
Counterpart Funds (FACF). The FACF Committee has
authorised ECU 705 010 to be paid in Egyptian pounds
into the FSDP revolving fund account.
64. The Financing Agreement has foreseen amounts of
ECU 350 700 (15 % of project total less contingencies)
for services provided by an international organisation and
ECU 1 067 500 for the organisation’s personnel and
office costs. These costs have now been spread over the
five projects in which the international organisation
participates. With regard to the allocation of office costs,
the Commission is in the process of obtaining
clarification from the international organisation.
Payment periods
65. The interest paid for late payment noted by the
Court was due to the late payment of an advance due in
1991. The 158 days delay was caused by events outside
the control of the Commission headquarters, which was
nevertheless obliged to release the penalty in the interests
of the project.
66. With regard to the ‘Ground Water Investigation’ in
Azraq (SEM/030628/006) it has to be noted that delays
in payments resulted from the payment procedure
through the banking system, which issued payments to
the sub-contractor in general currencies when the
contract clearly stated that payments should be made in
ECU.
68. With regard to the late payment referred to by the
Court, following the internal procedures of the
Commission it took between 42 and 53 days to process
the payment request received from the National
Authorising Officer.
Evaluation and external audits
69.-71. Since the inception of the projects covered by
the Court’s audit, improvements have been made in the
number of projects evaluated. In-depth monitoring of
audit reports and mid-term and ex post evaluations of
projects should now be possible, following the
establishment of an evaluation unit in the departments
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Concerning audits, the Commission, faced by a constraint
on personnel resources, has resorted to the use of
external auditors. A systematic programme of audits,
combining internal resources, project resources and
external auditors, is being prepared for 1998.
In addition, the Commission is increasingly trying to
include in the FA the obligation to accept external
audits.
Amendments to initial decisions
72.-80. The project officers, both at the Commission’s
headquarters and the delegations, had adopted a
pragmatic approach to implementing the financing
agreement. This resulted, as the Court has noted, in them
varying the conditions attached to financing agreements.
The responsibility for ensuring the appropriate approval
of contractual and legal matters has been separated from
the technical units and, to a substantial degree, from the
delegations and handed to the Finance and Resources
Directorate. In doing so, the internal control over
changes to financing agreements has been strengthened.
Therefore, any modification of the financing agreements
must be authorised in accordance with the rules.
Services provided by the technical assistance units
81. The Commission shares the Court’s opinion
concerning the overall quality of the technical assistance
provided to the projects.
82.-84. In one case, the consultant was replaced and, in
another, the consultant was allowed to continue the
contract and the matter is being closed.
Management by project leaders and the results
obtained
Observations in respect of the accounts and finances
85.-87. A programme for audit of projects for 1998 will
include the points identified by the Court.
The results recorded and the survival of the projects
88. The Court has recognised the dangers inherent in
development projects which require a balance between
technical assistance and the creation of a culture of
dependency. The examples given in paragraphs 89-98 are
a confirmation of this dilemma.
89. When the plant was due to be handed over to
GOSD it became evident that GOSD needed institutional
support for a limited time in order to build up its
capacities to manage a plant at this point of the Helwan
scheme. This was approved by the Commission and a
complementary financing of ECU 3 million was made
available for this task. The shortcomings of GOSD noted
by the auditors were recognised at the time and measures
were taken to improve their management capacity.
90. It is not unusual that the staff (mainly paid by the
contractors) running and maintaining the plant during
the testing period are unwilling to become government
employees. This is the reason why GOSD needed
technical assistance (TA) support for an intermediate
period after withdrawal of the contractors and change of
responsibility from government level to municipal level.
Such a transition period is critical and the Court’s
auditors visited the project just at this moment. The
situation has settled down since then, and the controlled
phasing out until 1998 of TA support is in progress. The
question of water pricing is highly sensitive politically
and could not be addressed specifically within the
project. However the EC, together with other major
donors have raised it with the GOE.
93. The Commission will follow up to ensure that
control over stocks and equipment is improved.
94.-96. See general reply for 88.
Conclusions in respect of the management of projects
99. The special report 3/91 and the replies to it have
formed the basis of a major revision of the Commission
procedures in dealing with aid given to the
Mediterranean countries. All the undertakings given by
the Commission could not be fully implemented on
projects that are funded by the third and fourth
protocols, because they were already in progress when
the report was drafted; they have nevertheless been
followed for the MEDA projects.
100.-102. The shortage of human resources, underlined
by the Court have, to an extent, been made good by the
budgetary provisions accompanying the MEDA
programme. The revised Commission structures’ impulse
by SEM 2000, has led to a clarification of
responsibilities, the separation of duties and the
establishment of clearer rules on the management of
projects.C 98/35 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
The necessary improvements will be continued by
increasing the Commission’s capacity to evaluate and
audit projects, further developing the computer systems
permitting the accounting and financial monitoring of
projects as well as devoting appropriate resources to the
expansion of the technical follow-up of projects.
101. See paragraphs 34-36 and 37-43.
103. The Commission notes the Court’s observations
regarding the definition of the management systems. This
has now become an essential point to be treated in detail
in the examination of projects phase and should also be
included in the FA.
The Commission generally seeks to use national
administrations to implement projects, adapting the
proposed system to the capacities of the administration.
As part of the process of setting up Meda, the
Commission is establishing the necessary instruments to
facilitate project management and negotiating framework
agreements with each Mediterranean partner, which
determine the statutory framework and the
administrative arrangements for implementing projects
and programmes. Starting from a common base, they will
take account of various proposals and specific situations
of the non-member Mediterranean countries.
THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS ADMINISTERED
BY THE EIB ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION AND
THEIR AUDIT
General presentation of the audit
107. The Commission and the EIB are careful to follow
up the Court’s requests.
At the time of the annual planning discussions with the
representative of the Court responsible for coordinating
the audits of projects administered by the EIB, the EIB
Audit Committee expressed the wish that there should be
a balanced distribution of visits throughout the year and
that the programme should take account of local
administrative differences and public holidays. Such
planning is quite usual for two audit bodies.
The Audit Committee is always willing to organise visits
jointly when requested in accordance with the Tripartite
Agreement between the institutions, sometimes at very
short notice, depending on the country.
In addition, to enable the Court to draw the maximum
benefit from on-the-spot visits, information meetings are
always organised in advance.
The system of risk capital management
The purpose of risk capital and conditions of eligibility
110. The interpretation of the terms for granting risk
capital is compatible with the objectives of this type of
assistance. The terms for each project are submitted for
approval to the Article 9 Committee (representatives of
Member States’ governments and a representative of the
Commission), in accordance with the regulations.
Description of the management system
Financing procedures and contractual framework
114.  a)  Although the observation may be true of certain
operations under the third protocol, it does not
apply to most of the operations under the
fourth protocol.
b) In general, the risk of exchange losses is
charged to the Community (see second
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the
management agreement between the
Commission and the EIB of 16 June 1987 and
17 December 1992). It is inherent in the nature
of capital acquisition transactions.
Appraisal and monitoring of projects
117. Another usual method is a global loan for which
appraisal is delegated and the EIB retains the powers of
decision, whether own resources or risk capital are
involved.
The Court’s observations at the conclusion of the audit
Appraisal of the projects
122. The weakness was identified by the EIB, which
reacted by giving more weight to the companies’
technological or commercial contribution than to their
straightforward capital injection, which has too often
proved to have little impact in the medium term.
123. The EIB is familiar with the problem, which
demonstrates the importance of boosting own funds with
risk capital.
124. The EIB carries out regular inspections and notes
the progress made by the IFIs in this respect.C 98/36 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.3.98
Concentration of aid
126. It should be noted that in Morocco nearly all the
banks use the credit line. Given the great demand for
project funds in Morocco, it is efficient and normal that
the IFI’s own clients introduce suitable projects. This
does not preclude others from introducing their
projects.
127.-130. When launched by the Community and the
EIB, the availability of global loans for the SME sector
had been an innovative activity. In the development
context, it has not been easy to identify suitable projects
presented by financially stable SMEs wishing to borrow
in foreign exchange. At the time, some of the IFI’s did
not have the experience to extend funds under the credit
line to SMEs, though this appears to be changing over
time.
A further reason why the take-up rate of global loans has
been low has been the exposure to exchange risks and
vagaries of export markets, together with conditions
prevailing in the local environment which was
characterised by a low growth of GDP and abundance of
other funds.
The Mediterranean companies normally receive revenues
in local currency. The loans offered at very favourable
rates have been counterbalanced by the exposure to
exchange risk and business risk inherent to the SME
sector.
In light of the above experience, the EIB cancelled ECU
17,4 million of the own resources loan. Of the ECU
3 million risk capital, only ECU 0,52 million was
disbursed and the remaining ECU 2,48 million cancelled.
The Community financial interest was therefore
safeguarded.
Overall monitoring of the operations by the EIB
131. It has been confirmed that monitoring is being
stepped up.
Implementation of the fourth protocols
135. It is now clear that the concept of joint ventures
needs to be more flexible. The definition has been
extended to include all forms of cooperation without
necessarily entailing joint participation in capital, thus
speeding up the utilisation of credit lines.
Clearly under the new procedures the loans are less
open-ended: this reflects the normal evolution of the
financial market which is becoming more mature and
open to the gradual introduction of new instruments. The
EIB considers that its role is to encourage the expansion
of the range of financial products on offer for SMEs.
136. Support for promoters without foreign partners is
included in the new guidelines for the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership policy, designed to make
SMEs in non-member Mediterranean countries more
competitive following the elimination of customs
protection planned in the new association agreements.
Management of interest rate subsidies
Audit findings
Dormant commitments and monitoring
140.-142. The recent installation of a systematic
information system will lead to improved information
about interest rate subsidies.
As part of its periodic review of sleeping and slow
moving commitments, the Commission has re-examined
projects covered by the Court’s audit to determine their
continued financial needs. Following its review, the
Commission has closed off or revised the projects
examined by the Court and decommitted the funds
surplus to requirements.
Observations on the management of interest rate
subsidies
147.-148. See reply in paragraphs 140 to 142 above.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Considerations relating to the system of protocols
150.-152. The Court correctly notes that experience in
implementing the Mediterranean protocols was taken
into account in Council Regulation No 1488/96 MEDA.
The framework for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
provides for financial and technical measures relating to
reforms of the economic and social structures of its
Mediterranean partners.
Considerations relating to the Commission’s system of
management
153.-158. With the rapid development of the
Mediterranean policy, the shortage of human resources
has become felt. Nevertheless, the Commission has,
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of project management, sought to use its resources
effectively and efficiently.
This process will be refined further through the creation
of a joint administrative service which was decided by the
Commission on 15 October 1997. The division of
responsibilities and separation of tasks between the
headquarters and delegations and within Brussels
between the technical and service units, is being
reappraised.
These developments have been accompanied with a
clarification of rules and procedures on contract and
financial management. Finally, the resources available to
evaluation and audit activities are being increased both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
Following experience from the conception and
implementation of the protocols, the Commission has
taken necessary measures to ensure that the follow-up of
MEDA projects is not constrained but carried out with
care.
Considerations relating to the operations managed by
the EIB on behalf of the Commission
159. Over 200 beneficiaries have profited from the third
and fourth protocols, except for the situation outlined in
replies to paragraphs 127-136, where the Community’s
financial interest needed safeguarding, there has not been
an excessive concentration of funds awarded.
160. The Commission is reviewing its procedures with
the EIB and has, in the meanwhile, reinforced the
resources available to ensure closer monitoring of the
flow of information between the two institutions.